Virtually every city has some form of organization that brings together civic leaders in an effort to address the city’s problems and have a positive impact upon them. What do we know about these organizations and how effective they are? In an effort to answer these questions, we undertook a systematic review of the literature, focusing on both who participates (i.e., who is at the table?) in these leadership organizations and how effective these organizations are. We were particularly concerned with whether the first question – who participates? – is related in a systematic way to the second – the effectiveness of these organizations in bringing about positive urban change.

The results of our efforts were extremely disappointing. Despite the clear importance of the questions, little empirical literature addressed them, and even less produced generalizable results. The literature consists almost entirely of case studies, some of which described the sectors participating and others of which did not. The effectiveness of the efforts of these civic leadership collaborations was seldom addressed, and when it was, it was invariably in terms of outputs rather than outcomes. Variations in sectors participating were not linked to effectiveness of the collaboration.

The research did provide us with the following information.

Who is at the table?
Traditional partnerships between the economic elite and the political elite are slowly giving way to more inclusive collaborations, involving certain non-profits, such as higher
education institutions and medical centers on par with business leaders, and bringing in community representatives. Organizational forms differ, but the business leadership organizations tend to be broadening their membership as well as forming partnerships with other groups in new organizations. Other groups, particularly those reflecting minority leadership, neighborhood or community leadership, and leadership from various non-profit sectors are sometimes included and sometimes not.

**Outcome effectiveness.**

The literature was weakest in identifying outcomes and measuring the effectiveness of organizations’ actions. While the downtown redevelopment plan may have resulted in ten new buildings (output), did it address the employment problem it was intended to solve (outcomes)? The literature did identify some factors that may be associated with an organization’s ability to be effective. These included longevity, adaptability, leadership, and narrow focus. There was some evidence that inclusiveness of a wide range of sectors also contributed to success, or, more accurately, lack of inclusiveness was likely to impede success.

**Barriers to Success: Relationship of participation inclusiveness to organizational effectiveness.**

Some studies identified factors that prevented successful collaborations. The primary element was the absence or exclusion of leadership from important sectors. This resulted from leaders from these sectors not being invited to participate or because representatives from these sectors were at the table but not participating actively (intentionally or not) as a result of power imbalances. The lack of effective participation of leadership from these sectors affected civic leadership activity both because it deprived the collaborative organization of the full range of ideas about how to proceed, but also because exclusion is often a strong force to mobilize community groups who can impede progress on an initiative.

We conclude that the questions we asked are important ones and that the literature is deficient in providing answers. We also conclude that the questions are researchable
ones and we end by posing a research agenda to increase our knowledge of who participates in civic leadership collaborations, how effective the activities of these collaborations are, and the relationship of participant composition to effectiveness.

**Introduction**

Virtually every city has some form of organization that brings together civic leaders in an effort to address the city’s problems and have a positive impact upon them. What do we know about these organizations and how effective they are? In an effort to answer these questions, we undertook a systematic review of the literature, focusing on both who participates (i.e., who is at the table?) in these leadership organizations and how effective these organizations are. We were particularly concerned with whether the first question – who participates? – is related in a systematic way to the second – the effectiveness of these organizations in bringing about positive urban change. In addition, we surveyed the literature for empirical information about the motives of various sectors for participation in civic leadership organizations and activities and the kinds of behaviors, strategies, or leadership characteristics of these organizations that lead to **effective** urban activity.

These questions were pursued through a review of a very diverse set of literature, including studies of urban and regional leadership, public-private partnership, governance, and cross-sectoral collaboration in a variety of disciplines, including political science, sociology, public administration, business, and organizational behavior, and advocacy oriented work on behalf of particular strategies or structures. Most of these involved case studies, usually of one city, although there were some comparative case studies as well. Our focus is on empirical results – what do we know about what sectors are “at the table” in different urban contexts and how effective different structures are. (See appendix A for methodology and literature review frame.)

The results of our efforts were extremely disappointing. Despite the clear importance of the questions, little empirical literature addressed them, and even less produced generalizable results. Much of the literature consisted of single city case studies of a
particular activity or organization, but with no common thread across case studies, thus making comparison and generalization impossible. A substantial amount of literature was on public-private partnerships, either structured around a particular project or a general history of the partnership spanning decades. The role of business in urban affairs is a relatively common theme in the political science and sociology literature, but usually in terms of how business pursues its self-interest and dominates urban decision making at the expense of broader and more democratic interests. Literature from Business School researchers sometimes examines the role and activity of business-centered organizations at the urban level, but seldom in the context of business participation in cross-sectoral collaborative efforts. Much of the literature consisted of recommendations for how to bring about effective organizational activity or leadership aimed at urban improvement, but with no compelling empirical foundation.

The literature we reviewed dealt with a variety of urban civic leadership collaborative forms. Collaborations can range from formal organizations with their own staff, such as New Detroit, the Allegheny Conference, and Cleveland Tomorrow, loosely organized networks of several pre-existing organizations, such as the San Diego Regional Biotechnology Initiative, ad hoc collaborations such as came into existence in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, permanent organizations or networks devoted to a single issue such as El Paso’s Collaborative for Academic Excellence in education, and public-private partnerships organized around a specific project such as the Urban Village development in Seattle or the US Cellular Field and United Center development in Chicago. Not surprisingly, who sits at the table is likely to vary according to the type of form the organization takes.

Participation is also related to the purpose for which the organization exists and the agenda it undertakes. Hastings (1996) contends that partnerships can create two different types of synergies: resource or policy. Resource synergy is adding value by combining resources. A typical example would be a business organization working with the local government on an economic development project. Policy synergy arises from obtaining different perspectives to develop more innovative solutions. The type of synergy that the
coalition seeks can determine who should be at the table. If the goal is to create policy synergy, for example, to address the city’s need for economic restructuring, a variety of perspectives and cultures must be reflected at the table. Since the options considered by a partnership are usually limited by the partners’ interests, failure to include all significant elements of the community can limit the choice set and result in the full costs not being considered (Giarratini & Houston, 1989, 556). The purpose of the collaboration matters; it determines who should be involved.

Who Is At The Table?

Civic leadership collaborations usually involve the business and government sectors, but the non-profit, institutional and foundation sectors, as well as community and minority groups, may be involved as well. The literature we reviewed covered a wide range of collaborations with different sectors participating, though the traditional business-government partnerships dominated. The prototypical business-government partnership is often accomplished through the creation and evolution of a CEO organization, such as Cleveland Tomorrow, which was created as a small cadre of business leaders who could commit resources immediately (Hanson, Connolly & Wolman, 2006). Recently Cleveland Tomorrow merged with three other organizations to form The Cleveland Partnership, a more inclusive organization, including small business owners, minority business owners, and community representatives.

Pittsburgh’s Allegheny Conference on Community Development is a similar organization that initially consisted of local corporate CEO’s who worked closely with the Mayor on economic development (Jezierski, 1996; Sbragia, 1990). Over time, collaborations in Pittsburgh began including neighborhood organizations, but only after they mobilized and demanded to be included (Sbragia, 1989). As universities and hospitals have replaced steel companies and other manufacturers as the major Pittsburgh employers, the non-profits are developing a mechanism for communicating and negotiating with local government officials, perhaps through the Allegheny Conference (Sbragia, 1990).
Detroit Renaissance and New Detroit are an example of two CEO lead organizations in the same city. The former consists of Detroit area CEOs and was founded to promote physical and economic development, while the latter, New Detroit, is a broad-based civic leadership organization including members from business, government, clergy, civil rights and advocacy organizations, and community organizations, created to provide a forum for developing solutions to avoid future race riots (Hula and Jackson-Elmore, 2001).

While the literature focuses more on these long-term collaborations, which may span decades, other partnerships are formed on a more short-term basis, often to respond to a specific crisis (New Orleans post-Katrina), a special opportunity (Atlanta’s quest for the Olympics), or a particular project (a new stadium). These alliances may dissolve after their tasks are accomplished, or they may develop into stable, permanent structures (Hamilton, 2004). Participants in the post-Katrina New Orleans task force included local, state, and federal government representatives, with some business elites and community groups (Burns & Thomas, 2006). However, without a history of communication and experience working together, it can be difficult for the parties to develop and implement an agenda as the Katrina effort at collaboration suggests. Project-oriented collaborations were less likely to include peak associations and more likely to include specific groups involved in or affected by the project. The development of US Cellular Field and United Center in Chicago, for example, involved local government (including the Mayor) and the sports franchise owner, negotiating with opposing neighborhood coalitions and an interfaith organizing group (Bennett & Spirou, 2006).

Issue-oriented collaborations may engender broad participation around a specific issue of concern, including interests concerned with that issue area. For example, civic leaders in El Paso, Texas created the Collaborative for Academic Excellence. Initiated by the University president, the Collaborative included the presidents of the regional, Black and Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, the county executive, key education officials, and a community organizer (Stone, 2003).
We also reviewed the literature for information on the motives for participation of various sectors in leadership collaboratives. While much of this literature focused on the business sector, other sectors were sometimes discussed as well.

**Business Sector**

Research on urban governance has focused mostly on the multitude of public-private partnerships between a city’s economic and political elites, particularly around the economic development process. The private business sector has been an important component in urban governance coalitions, providing important resources and encouraging business investment (Kilburn, 2004). As Hanson, Wolman, Connolly and Pearson note, “Corporate civic elites have played a major role in the building, rebuilding, governance, and functioning of major American cities” (2006, 1). Historically, a core group of business leaders in the community, including CEOs of national corporations headquartered in the city and major locally owned businesses (department stores, banks, newspapers, utility companies) played a major role. For example, “the Group” in Charlotte, NC, consisted of six businessmen, including the CEOs of NationsBank, First Union, and Duke Power, who worked with the Mayor on downtown revitalization (McDougall, 1997a). Similar CEO organizations were part of the urban regime in Cleveland (Hanson, Connolly, & Wolman, 2006), Pittsburgh (Jezierski, 1996; Sbragia, 1998), Buffalo (Perry, 1990), and other cities.

However, global economic forces have resulted in a decline in locally-owned firms and corporations headquartered in many cities through mergers and acquisitions. These trends have resulted in less direct participation by CEOs and, indeed, frequently less interest and participation by major corporations. As Hanson, Wolman, Connolly and Pearson (2006) explain, “many regions simply now have fewer top executives among whom to spread civic work, and those executives often lack either interest or experience in civic affairs” (14). Peirce and Johnson (1997) similarly describe an “absentocracy – revolving door leadership, with frequent reassignment to other cities” combined with economic challenges as reasons for less involvement by business leaders (35). In addition,
the movement of business headquarters from the central business district to the suburbs results in greater interest in regional issues, at the cost of reduced focus and energy being invested in central cities (Orr & Stoker, 1994).

The decline in the number of wealthy business enterprises in cities that have CEOs engaged in central city affairs has led to changes in who is involved in civic-oriented business organizations and how they operate. Organizations that are still CEO-based may now include CEOs from major non-profit organizations, such as universities and hospitals, as well as CEOs of service partnerships (law, accounting and consulting firms) and smaller businesses, including minority-owned businesses. (See Austin, 2000; Hanson, Connolly & Wolman, 2006.) Despite changing membership and scope, the existing organizations often continue to play a significant role in their communities. These coalitions mobilize funds for investment, offer capacity and expertise, serve as a catalyst for involving the greater business community, and provide a continuing presence during changes in political leadership (Austin & MacCaffrey, 2002; Austin, 2000).

In some cities, the local newspaper publisher was a major player in CEO leadership organizations, for example, the publisher of the Cleveland Plain Dealer (Hanson, Connolly & Wolman, 2005) and The Charlotte Observer (McDougall, 1997a). Stanford Lipsey, the publisher of the Buffalo Evening News, took the initiative when he moved to Buffalo to develop a group of influential CEOs who could help regenerate Buffalo, establishing what became known as the Buffalo 18 (Perry, 1990). As with banks and other corporations, mergers, economic pressures, and a greater focus on the region rather than the city have reduced the leadership provided by the local newspaper publisher. However, local media continue to play an important role in its portrayal of collaborations and their initiatives (Iglitzin, 1995; Waddock & Post, 1991), by giving communities a voice (McDougall, 1997a; Parr, 1997), and convening meetings to discuss regional planning and research (see, e.g., Pastor, Dreier, Grigsby, & Lopez-Garza, 2000).

**Government Sector**
Local government, as the source of public authority and legitimacy, is nearly always a participant in important civic collaborations. The relationship between the mayor and other sector representatives is of particular importance (Hula & Jackson-Elmore, 2001) and can significantly impact the outcome of an initiative (Orr & Stoker, 1994; Hanson, Connolly & Wolman, 2006). While some researchers have focused on the structure of local government as an important factor (Portz, Stein & Jones, 1999; Reese, 1997), most have been concerned with the ability of the individual mayor to build relationships with different components of the civic leadership and with the ability of these groups to understand and communicate with the Mayor (Austin, 2000; Hanson & Norris, 2006; Reushke, 2001).

Hula and Jackson-Elmore (2001) note in their case study of two Detroit organizations the need for these organizations to have strong working relationships with elected political officials to move policies forward. Relationships with Mayor Young and then Mayor Archer had a large impact on the ability of the non-profit to be effective. For example, New Detroit, which had the support of Young, was considered of only marginal relevance when Archer was elected Mayor, because of its Young connection. In Baltimore, the relationship between businesses and the Mayor was significantly different with Mayor Schaefer than with Mayor Schmoke, leading Hanson and Norris to conclude, “all politics is not only local, it is also personal” (2006, 18). As this suggests, inclusion of elected officials in civic collaborations, while often seen as a key to success, can nonetheless create instability in the coalition since elections may result in a new official who has a different agenda or focuses on different relationships. A successful partnership may require continually negotiating relationships with key members of the government sector.

While local elected officials play an important role, state and federal officials may also have a seat at the table, especially if the agenda includes social issues, such as education reform or affordable housing. The State taking a seat at the table is not always viewed positively by local coalitions. The New Jersey Governor’s collaboration with Newark business leaders to take over Newark’s failing school system was viewed as interference
rather than partnership by the local players, including Newark’s Board of Education, School Superintendent, teachers, union leaders, and parents (Burns, 2003). However, the Colorado Governor’s participation with business and local government in Denver was welcomed in forming the Greater Denver Corporation to make community development investments (Johnson, 1997).

State government may sometimes be a key player at the table because of its ability to provide resources and to leverage agreement among leadership across sectors. In a study of city coalition making at the state legislative level, Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom (2005) present several examples of governor-brokered coalitions in Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois.

Federal agencies’ participation, often in connection with providing resources, may also be viewed positively or negatively. For example, HUD’s funding of a community bank in Los Angeles was accompanied by restrictions which are blamed in part for the venture’s failure (Rubin and Stankiewicz, 2001).

**The Non-Profit Sector**

The decline in participation by the traditional business sector has resulted in greater participation by other sectors – foundations, educational and health care institutions, and non-profit groups (Hanson, Wolman, Connolly & Pearson, 2006). These non-profit organizations are expanding from their traditional roles of service providers and policy advocates to building coalitions and initiating policy (Hula & Jackson-Elmore, 2001).

*Foundations:* In some cities foundations have been involved in supporting community initiatives for decades. Their traditional role in providing financial support for the initiatives determined by the business/government coalition has transformed to include a more significant ability to set the agenda. Two factors may account for this increased role: (1) as businesses provide less financial support to the community, foundation support has become more important, and (2) foundation executives are now members of
business organizations (Hanson, Wolman, Connolly & Pearson, 2006; Reushke, 2001). The greater role played by foundations may change the agenda, with less focus on economic development and more focus on social, educational, health care and community issues (Hanson et al., 2006). For example, the Cleveland Foundation supported the formation of Cleveland Tomorrow and contributed financially to its activities. More recently, it has worked to obtain private sector funding for housing development and neighborhood revitalization (Lowe, 2004). The Lyndhurst Foundation funded Chattanooga Venture, allowing it to assemble a diverse board consisting of business, government, and community leaders without being beholden to one group (Parr, 1997). This may have improved the community building intermediary’s ability to address housing, environmental and education issues.

**Education and Health Care Institutions:** Universities, community colleges, and hospitals are often the largest or among the largest employers in their cities, and this status offers opportunities for leadership on city initiatives (Jezierski, 1996; Peirce & Johnson, 1997). As Austin quotes, “the reality is that universities and foundations are big businesses” (2000, 317). As large organizations that benefit from tax exemptions, they are often viewed as having an obligation to give back to the community (Adams, 2003; Berman & West, 1995). And they are well-situated to do so, having an impact on land use, involved in residential well being as an employer and a service provider, and with resources and opportunities available for taking a leading role. Universities are increasingly becoming more involved in collaborations to address city and regional problems (Paytas et al., 2004). Examples provided by Peirce & Johnson (1997, 37-38) include Portland State University, which was significantly involved in the initiation of regional governance, and four universities in the Chicago area that developed the Policy Action Research Group, which performs research and policy analysis in the Chicago region. University of California, San Diego has been instrumental in several collaborations, initiating the San Diego Dialogue (McDougall 1997c), and developing UCSD Connect to support the region’s biotechnology initiative (Fitzgerald, Perry & Jaffe). The “Eds and Meds” offer important resources and, as they play an increasing
economic role in cities, may be playing a greater leadership role in collaborations to address city problems.

*Community and Advocacy Groups:* Since the 1960s community groups have played an important role in civic affairs, sometimes acting collaboratively with other civic leadership sectors and sometimes engaging in conflict with them. Community groups range from formal organizations, some of which may be organized at the city or even the regional level such as an advocacy group for minorities, to neighborhood organizations, and to informal groups, reflected through an impromptu coalescing of community feelings. Community reaction and perceptions matter, regardless of whether a formal group has been created (Gendron, 2006). In many arenas, community groups have partnered with the government to develop community solutions (Parr, 1997) and to provide services, at times taking a leadership role (Pincetl, 2003). In other cases, regardless of where on the continuum of organizational form the group is, such groups can impede or prevent a project (See, e.g., Bennett & Spirou, 2006).

In San Antonio, Hispanic community advocacy groups formed during the 1960s, including Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS). Because of the group’s strong advocacy for decades, they have a seat at the table. This is in part due to their success in having city-wide elections replaced with single-district elections, resulting in seven of ten city council seats being held by Hispanics, along with the city manager and his deputy (McDougall, 1997b). COPS took the lead in collaborating with the Governor, the Mayor, the chamber of commerce, local community colleges, churches and business leaders to create Project Quest, a long-term training program for higher-skill jobs obtaining a $6.5 million contract with the city, with 600 jobs up front. (McDouggall, 156).

While many community and advocacy organizations mobilize in response to specific projects or growing inequities, as was the case in San Antonio, Mayors can be instrumental in bringing their constituents to the table. In Atlanta, the “city too busy to hate,” the community has a seat at the table: “[Mayor Jackson] brought the neighborhoods to the table with the NPUs [Neighborhood Planning Units]. [Mayor
Young] brought business back to the table. By the 1990s, everyone was at the table” (Adams, 1997, 8). Mayor Flaherty in Pittsburgh changed city processes to give neighborhood groups a voice in the planning process and ensured development funds no longer went primarily to the downtown but were substantially shared with the neighborhoods (Sbragia, 1989).

The literature often reflects the view that community groups are legitimate participants but suffer from a power imbalance which results in them often being ignored (see, e.g., Sbragia, 1989 on the Black community in Pittsburgh). As Squires explains, “what has frequently been overlooked, however, is the inherently unequal nature of most partnerships. Frequently, they exclude altogether the neighborhood residents most affected by development decisions. Public goals often go unmet and democratic processes are undermined” (1989, 3, citations omitted). Other observers have noted that many partnerships are of an unequal nature and that participation by the affected residents or constituents is often not a priority (Ferman, 1996). As we discuss below, excluding community representatives and minority groups from the table can have consequences, as an incomplete collaboration will not be as effective solving city problems and may not even address them.

**Effectiveness of Civic Leadership Collaborations**

The literature addresses two different aspects of effectiveness: 1) organizational (process) effectiveness - the ability of a civic leadership partnership to form, persist through time and engage in effective communication across sectors and 2) outcome effectiveness - the effectiveness of the activities/projects undertaken through civic leadership collaborations. Whether these two aspects are related to one another or not has gone largely unresearched. Nor has the relationship of who sits at the table (and who does not) been systematically related to outcome effectiveness.

**Organizational (Process) Effectiveness**
Research on organizational effectiveness is concerned both with the formation of organizational collaborations and with their persistence. The formation of partnerships depends on structural and organizational factors, as well as environmental factors such as history, culture, and politics (Hamilton, 2004; Waddell, 2000). It has been recommended that the types of public-private partnerships be better categorized so that we can begin to understand “how form, function, and outcomes are related” since differences in partnership characteristics are important to their success or failure (Schaeffer & Loveridge, 2001, 5). For example, organizations may be divided into “bridging organizations” – where the organization is clearly led by one sector but reaches out to other sectors to work collaboratively (such as Cleveland Tomorrow), and “trisectoral organizations” – where all three sectors work together to support and structure the organization (such as Chattanooga Venture) (Waddell, 2000, 119).

Which party initiates the collaboration, convening the other parties, affects who comes to the table and what resources they will bring (Stone, 2003). Previous successful collaborations make it more likely that involved parties will join together to address challenges facing the city or region (Hamilton, 2004). However, as Stone states: “There is no one formula for bringing institutional sectors into an arrangement for cooperation, and the whole process is imbued with uncertainty” (1989, 9).

Mutual benefit is important to the formation of partnerships (Googins & Rochlin, 1991; Waddock, 1988). “The risks and benefits of the venture need to be shared, so when success is achieved all partners are better off” (Wilson & Charlton, in Googins & Rochlin, 1991, 131). If the parties’ interests are incompatible, then, while the organization may continue, cooperation will not (Schaeffer & Loveridge, 2001). Googins and Rochlin note that recognizing areas for mutual benefit and defining mutual benefits are easier said than done however. In particular, since the different sectors do not readily interact with one another and are often driven by different goals, it is hard for them to speak the same “language” (See also, Smith & Beazley, 2000). Intermediaries, like research, managerial expertise and training, may be needed to help build understanding across sectors. Related to the concept of policy synergy, discussed above, is a recognition that each sector has its
own strength and weaknesses: “Although one sector can learn from another, taken too far this suggestion can undermine the very rationale for having distinct sectors: the distinct weaknesses, competencies and assets that go with a sector are the basis for interaction and exchanges” (Waddell, 2000, 118).

Partnerships between government and business may be common because both sectors can identify easily the benefits of joining political and economic power (Hamilton, 2004). Partnerships between businesses and community organizations are more challenging; yet each has qualities and skills that make a partnership beneficial. The business sector offers financial resources, technical expertise, management training, manpower, leveraging relationships between stakeholders and board participations (Googlin & Rochlin, 1991). Austin (2000) echoes many of these claims and contends that the training, resources and business acumen brought to the table make business a necessary partner. Community groups and non-profit agencies may offer a strong infrastructure (such as schools and child care), “service learning” opportunities for training, access to unique data on the community, support for employee and community interests, and support during time of crisis (Googins & Rochlin, 1991). San Antonio is an example of where the community group brought its skills and services to the table and convinced the government and business sectors that they would benefit from training residents for higher-skill jobs (McDougall, 1997b). Research on intersectoral partnerships emphasizes the importance of each sector understanding what the others offer and what their constraints are (Hastings, 1996; Waddell, 2000).

An abundance of so-called partnerships form on a regular basis, but many of them end up being a one-way transfer of resources rather than an exchange relationship (Googlin & Rochlin, 1991; see also Hastings, 1996). “The formation of the purported ‘partnership’ is not worth heralding if it is in name only. Rather, it is the strength, character, and duration of the ‘partnering’ process that establishes systems for mutual gain and commitments that merits advocacy” (Googin & Rochlin, 142; see also Hartley, 2002). A partnership between the business sector and the progressive local government to rebuild Santa Cruz’ central business district after the 1989 earthquake is an example of a partnership in name
only (Gendron, 2006). The political leaders were forced to work with the business leaders after decades of animosity between the groups when the business leaders brought in national experts on public private partnerships who talked about the importance of cooperation and community. Recognizing it had no alternative, but concerned about losing political control, the government formed Vision Santa Cruz with business, government and community members, but kept tight control on the process and terminated the organization as soon as the rebuilding was completed. As the Mayor stated when interviewed by the author, “there are different agendas. . . we care about different things. . . . There are real, structural, basic differences in what we want” (18).

As mentioned above, environmental factors also affect the likelihood of civic leadership collaborations, who is likely to sit at the table, and how conflict is handled. For instance, observers frequently comment on the quality of “civic culture” in a city (see, e.g., McDougall, 1997a; Portz et al., 1999). Exploring civic culture is often defined by questions such as: Is there a tradition of civic cooperation? Is there suspicion between residents, officials and business leadership? Is there conflict along racial lines? (Ferman 1996; Portz et al., 1999). The literature reviewed highlights the attributes of both weak and strong “civic cultures.”

References to poor civic culture often point to cities that inherit political systems that are heavily oriented towards patronage or “machine-like” politics (Ferman, 1996 (Chicago); Portz et al., 1999 (St. Louis)). Collaborative efforts operating under such an environment, as well as those operating under an “anti-business” mayoralty, are portrayed as generally being reactive instead of proactive. In other words, the private sector looks towards partnering opportunities as they present themselves, since there is no opportunity to develop a shared strategy. In reference to Detroit during the “clientelism” of Mayor Young, DiGaetano and Lawless (1999) note: “Development decision making, simply put, lapsed into a game of ‘let’s make a deal’ on a project-by-project basis” (560).

Other factors emerging from the literature that affect the persistence and effectiveness of collaboration across sectors include:
• Leadership Turnover: Turnover in leadership in supporting organizations as well as in government which can lead to a loss of shared vision developed over a long time through prior relationships (Igltzin, 1995; McDougall, 1997a).

• Conflict Resolution: In an examination of the growing role of non-profits in Pittsburgh, Sbragia (1990) notes the lack of a forum to mediate conflicts between non-profits or between them and the government makes it difficult to get non-profits to cooperate.

• Public Participation and Strategic Focus: Difficulties in developing public participation while maintaining a strategic focus on outcomes. Participation may be required in a variety of circumstances: as a requirement of public or private funding, as a political necessity, or as a goal itself of the project.

• Leadership Skills: Because cross-sector collaborations, especially those wishing to work on comprehensive reform of government agencies, often involve addressing more challenging issues than bricks and mortar redevelopment, learning new skills for leadership will be essential (Hartley, 2002; Lowndes & Skelcher, 2004; Waddell, 2000).

• History Matters: As sectors work together and experience positive results, they are likely to use collaboration, perhaps maintaining the same organizational structure, to address future city problems. One factor cited in New Orleans’ inability to respond to the challenges of Hurricane Katrina was the lack of a history of collaborative action (Burns & Thomas, 2006).

Googlin & Rochlin (1991) have identified several additional facilitators of success in the process of partnership: defining clear goals, obtaining senior level commitment, engaging in frequent communication, assigning professionals to lead the work, sharing the commitment of resources, evaluating progress/results). The absence of many of these elements is one reason that “forced” collaborations resulting from federal incentives often are ineffective.

Outcome Effectiveness
Although certain indicators of success and effectiveness were treated in the literature there was limited direct measurement of these outcomes. The lack of outcome measurement is noted elsewhere in the literature as well (e.g., Austin and MacCaffrey 2002). Indeed, efforts in the literature to assess the effectiveness of activities of civic leadership collaboratives, if such efforts were undertaken at all, invariably focused on outputs rather than outcomes. Thus, while the activity may have been carried out (e.g., a crime prevention plan, an educational reform measure, or a city marketing scheme may have been put in place), the question of whether the outcome to which these activities were presumably directed (reduced crime, improved educational performance, the attraction of more tourists) was seldom addressed. (See Hula, 1990, for a discussion of the difficulty in even understanding what would constitute successful economic development outcomes in his case study of Baltimore’s economic development partnership activities.) As a result, it is difficult to draw conclusions about outcomes from the material reviewed. The diversity in approaches across the studies—although very insightful from a contextual perspective—does not allow for much generalization into lessons learned.

Hula’s case study of Baltimore is an exception (Hula, 1990). He contends that Baltimore experienced downtown revival and the development of tourism as a result of successful partnerships between the city government and the business sector during the 1970s and 1980s. Hula discusses structural and financial arrangements that produced redevelopment of Charles Center and the Inner Harbor and resulted, by 1985, in investments of $2 billion, of which 75% was private investment, and the development of 4 million square feet of office space, 1 million square feet of retail/tourist space, and 3500 hotel rooms, all of which exceeded expectations. The only development goal that was not met was housing: only 1200 of 2700 expected units were developed. Baltimore also built an aquarium, a science center, a convention center, and other attractions to support a growing convention and tourism industry (Hula, 1990, 206). While the foregoing are output measures, Hula also discusses outcomes, e.g., the aquarium attracted 7 million visitor’s between 1981 and 1986 and generated $3.3mil in state taxes and 1.9 million in local taxes. By 1984, “it became increasingly clear that Inner Harbor was in
fact a commercial success” (203). In discussing impacts he notes “a more difficult
evaluation question is the distribution of benefits generated from the renewal” (206). He
comments on the low quality of the jobs produced and the lack of evidence of the overall
effect of the tourist industry on the job market. The result, he contends, is “two
Baltimores”: the downtown revived part and the ring around the center of decaying
neighborhoods. Thus, the collaboration was successful at accomplishing downtown
redevelopment, although the overall economy continued to deteriorate and poverty and
unemployment increased.

Pittsburgh’s experience is similar. Partnerships between the government and the business
sector, beginning in the 1940s, successfully accomplished “Renaissance I” and
“Renaissance II,” both of which focused on real estate redevelopment, not economic
restructuring. A more recent collaboration among the business sector, local government,
and universities resulted in Strategy 21, which brought forth $70 million in state funding
to develop the Pittsburgh Technology Center (Sbragia, 1990). While these partnerships
were successful in that the activities they designed actually occurred, Pittsburgh’s
economy continued to struggle, suggesting that governments are limited in what they
can accomplish through private-public partnerships; such partnerships may not be able to
address economic restructuring (Sbragia, 1989).

Chattanooga adopted a collaborative approach to address a broader range of issues.
Through a community visioning process, 40 goals were developed as part of Vision 2000
in 1984. These goals determined the projects, task forces, and organizations the city
needed. An evaluation of the city’s progress on those goals in 1992, found that steps had
been accomplished on 37 of the 40 (Parr, 1997). Again, this is a count of activities, not
outcomes.

Specific factors were, occasionally, identified in the case studies that were seen as
contributing to the success of certain initiatives. Longevity and adaptability, leadership,
and a narrow focus seemed to be some of the key factors. Since the context of each study
varies so dramatically however, there tended to be some contradiction in the elements of
success as well as some that did not translate outside of the specific context. The particular factors and the contexts in which they were identified are discussed below.

Longevity and Adaptability: Among the studies reviewed, a common facilitator of success was longevity, which was often related to an organization’s ability to adapt to changing needs (Jezierski, 1996). For example, some highlighted the longevity of a civic organization as a critical indicator of success—those that can survive through various administrations tended to be more successful at achieving what they set out to do (Hamilton, 2004; Hanson, Wolman, Connolly & Pearson, 2006). Pittsburgh is often cited as an example of a city with a longstanding relationship between government and business that enables the two sectors to effectively partner (Giarratini and Houston, 1989; Hamilton, 2004; Jezierski, 1996; Sbragia, 1990). The lack of continuity of business leaders within a peak organization is a challenge to forming effective partnerships. Hanson and Norris (2006) note that mayors must now spend time identifying and cultivating relationships with leaders from the new generation of executives but “the corporate executives and even the corporations keep changing” (25). Since longevity and adaptability are factors related to organizational effectiveness, this suggests, not surprisingly, some relationship between organizational effectiveness and outcome effectiveness.

Adaptability tended to come in different forms, some credit organizational adaptability and others credit the ability of the players to change the agenda in response to changing needs. Cleveland’s CEO organization, Cleveland Tomorrow, adapted its agenda as city issues changed and ultimately altered its organizational form, by merging with three other organizations, to maintain its ability to address Cleveland’s and the region’s problems (Hanson, Connolly, & Wolman, 2006). Other authors saw adaptability in terms of the agenda as a critical factor. Charlotte’s success is attributed, in part, to the ability of the agenda to change and for the coalitions to adjust as specific issues arose (McDougall, 1997a).
Leadership: Many studies emphasized the quality of the leadership as a critical factor in the success of urban collaborative efforts (Hula, 1990; Portz et al., 1999; Reese, 1997). In addition, one study used a path-analytic model on a sample of 35 cities in the United States to investigate what factors lead to success in cities by isolating leadership, resources and economic performance (Desantis & Stough, 1999). Regions with stronger strategic community leadership, measured through voluntary community (extra-governmental) effort, number of voluntary community organizations, expenditures of voluntary community organizations and economic development efforts, not only performed better economically, but also adjusted more quickly to change. Desantis and Stough highlighted the importance of local initiative by nongovernmental entities and the ability to access a broad range of resources as keys to successful leadership.

Narrow Focus: Another factor contributing to the success of urban collaboration according to some authors was the importance of a narrow focus. Austin (2000) reflects on the attributes of successful business leadership coalitions. Highlighting organizations like Cleveland Tomorrow, the Central Atlanta Project and the Minnesota Business Partnership, Austin praises their ability to focus prior to taking action and sticking to that plan (See also, Hanson, Connolly, & Wolman, 2006, with respect to the narrow focus and agenda criteria of Cleveland Tomorrow). Additionally, Austin also mentions the importance of specialization in these communities—these coalitions tended to focus on business related development efforts while civic/community agencies like the Twin Cities United Way, The Greater Cleveland Roundtable and the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce in each respective city have traditionally had a different specialization (more social services, racial and ethnic harmony issues, etc.).

Barriers to Success: The Importance of Who Is at the Table

Several authors discussed the failures of civic leadership collaboration initiatives and the factors that contributed to that failure. In this context, the question of who was (and was not) at the table and power imbalances among the collaborators was sometimes seen as a factor contributing to outcome effectiveness. For example, in Detroit, Detroit
Renaissance adopted an approach to economic development that differed from Mayor Young’s; the business organization wanted to focus on building human capital rather than further redevelopment of the downtown, since the latter had not been successful (Orr & Stoker, 1994). Orr and Stoker attributed Detroit Renaissance’s failure with the human capital strategy to the lack of the Mayor’s support, the absence of adequate representation of minorities, and the lack of the business sector’s commitment to improving the city other than for charitable or public relations purposes.

Who Was (and Was Not) at the Table: Some authors focused on barriers when marginalized groups were not included. In particular, community groups, ethnic minorities and small business owners seemed to be among the excluded in many of the cases (Ferman, 1996; Iglitzin, 1995; Portz et al., 1999; Reuschke, 2001; Rubin and Stankiewicz, 2001).

Other researchers attribute the failure of civic leadership efforts in Dallas (Hanson, 2002) and Houston (Parker & Feagin, 1990) at least in part to the exclusion of important groups. Describing Dallas’ business-dominated civic culture, Hanson observes: “Ironically, running the city as a closely held corporation in the interest of business resulted in a system that worked against that interest as it failed to resolve problems of education, race relations and governance” (357-358). Houston’s business/government partnership was similar. The Houston Economic Development Corporation excluded community groups and small businesses owners and ultimately accomplished little more than a marketing campaign, with transportation, education and pollution remaining significant problems for the city (Parker & Feagin, 1990).

In a more issue specific case, a partnership in Los Angeles created a community development bank with funding from HUD. The Mayor and City Council members disagreed on who should be on the board, community members were not included, bank executives were, and the ultimate structure was one of fragmentation (Rubin & Stankiewicz, 2001). The bank had high default rates on loans and was unable to meet its job creation objectives. Its failure was blamed in part on the organizational structure,
which decreased accountability, increased inefficiency, and suffered from internal conflicts.

The Seattle Commons Project was initiated by private citizens who were members of the economic elite. Positive media attention resulted in greater public acceptance of the project. Opposition to the project came from two sources, with different concerns. Small business owners feared they would be forced to relocate, since their position was not considered: “As small businessmen we have learned the lesson that we have no effect on public policy, virtually no voice at all” (622). Two housing advocacy groups also opposed the project, concerned that the leaders of the initiative were promoting their own self-interests in profits, excluding those with less power from the process, and “creeping up on the public process” by including public actors and officials unofficially without public consensus (Iglitzer, 1995). The 890-acre urban village was reduced to 74 acres, and even that scaled-back project was unsuccessful when voters rejected the property tax increase to fund it.

*Power Imbalances among Sector Collaborators:* While the organizational structure may be that of a partnership or similar form of collaboration, interactions among the participants and decision making processes within that partnership may not reflect equal power or participation (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). The ways in which the representatives consult and negotiate impacts their ability to meet their individual goals (Stone, 2004).

Complexities in the partnerships can make solid and equal partnering more difficult in terms of getting organizational buy-in and in including all affected parties. After the Los Angeles riots, an effort to revitalize the community through the development of the Los Angeles Community Development Bank exemplified this problem. According to the authors of the study, one of the primary failures of the initiative was its reactive rather than proactive partnership development techniques. Because it was predominantly federally funded, partners were designing the project to fit under federal funding guidelines, meanwhile leaving key community organizations out of the planning process. The relationship among the community development bank, community groups and
private banks was described as asymmetric and not a true partnership (Rubin and Stankiewicz, 2001).

Not only the structure of the partnership, but the detail of its workings, such as the time and the place of the meetings, and the language used at the meetings, may affect representatives’ participation (Smith & Beazley, 2000). Hula & Jackson-Elmore reference Schattschneider’s view that the venue affects the mix of core decision makers, which changes the mix of resources that parties can bring to the table and ultimately can change political outcomes (p. 332). For example, when a subset of members of the Bring New Orleans Back task force meet for lunch before each meeting, excluding the small business owner and others (Burns and Thomas, 2006), each voice may not have felt heard at the table.

Power asymmetries among collaboration partners may not be intentional or even recognized. Googins and Rochlin note that understanding each others’ worlds is often a difficult task for partners—different cultures and communities lead to a lack of interaction and miscommunication, different goals, and natural separation (1991, 135). The various organizations in Atlanta acknowledge that the community and business groups have difficulty working together, because they work in different ways. The staff rather than members of the business organization, Central Atlanta Progress, attend the meetings with neighborhood advocates. For these groups, the role of staff to bridge among the groups is essential (Adams, 1997). While groups from different sectors have collaborated for specific projects, particularly the 1996 Olympic Games, it is unclear whether such collaboration has become institutionalized.

Pittsburgh presents a more complex case of power imbalances. As previously noted, Pittsburgh has a long history of partnership between business and government. In response to some of the urban renewal projects, neighborhoods began organizing in the 1960s. When Flaherty was elected mayor in 1969, he reorganized the city’s planning department to institutionalize neighborhood access to the development and planning process (Sbragia, 1989). Federal funds were shared between neighborhood and
downtown development. Neighborhood groups continue to be involved in the city’s
economic development process. Interestingly, they have not addressed social services or
taken an advocacy role. Instead, it appears that they have pulled up a seat at the table
where business and government were already talking, accepted the agenda, and tried to
benefit where they could. The Black community, which was 25 percent of the population
in the late 1980s, has not organized so is not participating in the partnership and has
failed to receive benefits from the city’s economic development (Sbragia, 1989).

As the above indicates, there is some discussion in the literature of the adverse impact on
decision making and organizational effectiveness when civic leadership collaboratives
are insufficiently inclusive of leadership sectors, but the results are more suggestive than
definitive.

Summary

Cities are facing a growing number of challenging problems, including restructuring their
economies, improving the education system, and developing sustainable communities.
Addressing these difficult issues will require the business, government and community
sectors to work together. This report investigates who sits at the table in efforts to engage
in civic leadership collaboration (and who does not), how and under what conditions city
leaders get mobilized to engage in collaborative activities, and how effective the
activities of civic leadership collaborations are. Our review of case studies on
partnerships between and among sectors, which are limited in their generalizability and
application, provides limited guidance for developing successful partnerships. These
include:

- **Participants matter.** Bringing together leadership from a wide range of
  sectors brings together different resources, goals, and competencies. If
  leadership from important sectors are not brought into the collaboration, the
  possibility of engendering opposition to the leadership collaboratives activities
  increases.
• **Organizational form matters.** While essentially none of the empirical research related organizational form to outcome, theoretical work suggests that the organization needs to be designed in a manner that does not discount some members.

• **Leadership matters.** The challenges of intersectoral partnerships require leaders who can negotiate among groups with different languages and different goals. The role of the city mayor is of particular importance in civic leadership collaborations. Participants must be skilled at building consensus. Professional staff may serve an important role in bridging among people with different approaches to problem solving.

• **Context matters.** The theoretical and empirical works agree that there is no magic formula for ensuring an effective partnership. It will depend on history, culture, and many other factors.

Googins and Rochlin, writing in 2000, note that the concept and practice of partnerships remain at the very early stages of development:

Much of the conceptual underpinnings have not been developed and core stages and elements have neither been adequately identified nor tested within an empirical framework. If a major partnership process were to be created in any city in this country, it is highly unlikely that is would be guided by any prevailing model or well developed framework. The ability to generalize partnership models and capitalize on transferable knowledge is minimal at this time (141).

They note three important lacunae in our knowledge about civic leadership collaborations, which our review of the literature confirms remain unanswered:

1) How do effective, mutually beneficial partnerships form and prosper? What are the processes, critical success factors and barriers?

2) How do we measure the results of partnership? Through what means do we best evaluate the outcomes and impact of partnerships for the participating organizations and their stakeholders?
3) On a larger scale, how do we interpret whether the mechanism of partnership is indeed effective and appropriate or addresses issue of social welfare and justice? (pg. 141)

The literature review raises a series of questions that need to be addressed through future research. More systematic work needs to occur to improve consistency in outcome measurement, measures of process effectiveness, the scope and timeframe of the studies, and the impact of an author’s point of view. A proposed Research Agenda follows.

**Research Agenda**

The questions for which we searched the literature – who sits at the table (and who does not) in civic leadership collaborations, how effective are the outcomes of the activities of these collaborations, and to what extent does who sits at the table affect effectiveness – are important ones. The literature does not provide much in the way of answers to them and, in most cases, does not directly address them.

Yet they are researchable questions. Who participates in civic leadership collaborations could be determined through a survey sent to civic leadership collaboration organizations in a sample of medium and large sized-cities. The survey would simply ask for the organization’s executive board membership list and the position title of each of the members. Those data would permit us to determine the sectoral composition of civic leadership organizations and how that composition differs for different types of cities by size, region, economic circumstances and other relevant criteria. The survey could also ask similar questions about board composition of the organization ten and/or 20 years ago, which would allow us to analyze change in sectoral composition.

Determining the effectiveness of the activities of civic leadership organizations requires information about a prior question – what these activities are. We know very little systematically about what these organizations actually do. The survey could also ask each of the organizations to describe their major projects/activities over the past five
years. We could then categorize the major activities by type and examine whether civic leadership organization activities differed according to who sits at the table, region, city size and other relevant characteristics.

Collecting the basic data described in the above two paragraphs seems almost embarrassingly simple for a research project. However, the simple fact is that such data do not currently exist, and without them it is virtually impossible to come to reasonable assessments of civic leadership organizations.

The final, and admittedly more difficult step, would be to assess the effectiveness of these organizations in terms of the outcomes of their activities. There may be a variety of ways this could be accomplished, but the two simplest would be either through intensive case studies of civic leadership organizations in a small number of cities or through a survey of “knowledgeable observers” in a larger number of cities. Neither of these would result in systematic generalizations of outcome effectiveness that would meet the standards of evaluation researchers, but either or both would result in better information than is now available.
Methodology: Several databases were searched using predetermined search terms and tracking citations forward:

Databases Searched: Proquest Full Text, EBSCO Host, JSTOR, Sociological Abstracts, Google for Scholars, Web of Science.

Search terms used (in combination with one another): —Regime theory, urban governance, collaboration, city leadership, corporate leadership, urban leadership, urban development, economic development, public-private partnerships, social capital.

Additionally we investigated the work of known experts in the field, meanwhile tracking references used in reviewed articles. Furthermore, we searched foundation websites for additional materials not typically housed in the library databases. The studies located through this search are identified in the Bibliography section of this document.

In limiting the scope of the search, we only investigated literature from the mid 1980’s forward. However, of the articles and papers reviewed a wide range of urban issues were addressed in a variety of geographic locations.

Frame: The frame through which the literature was searched and reviewed follows:

1. Who is “at the table”?
   a. Who are members of major urban leadership organizations – from what sectors do they come and are they representatives of those sectors?
2. What are the kinds of relationships (partnerships, coalitions, networks, etc.) among organizations and leaders engaged in major urban activity?
   a. How prevalent are they?
   b. Who are they between?
3. What do we know about how effective the different arrangements in (1) and (2) above are in bringing about desired results?
4. How have the arrangements described in (1) and (2) above changed over time?
5. What do we know about effective leadership behavior, and strategies, both organizationally and individually?
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References


