

Contexts for Neighborhood Revitalization: A Comparative Overview

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Why do cities differ in the focus, content, and tools of the neighborhood regeneration activity they pursue? Although neighborhood revitalization policies in North America are not likely to be straightforward responses to neighborhood distress, the account of the new politics of neighborhood revitalization provided in Chapter 1 emphasizes socio-economic context; specifically, the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. Our investigation of local politics and policy, which we take up in detail in the individual city chapters that follow, is built on the conviction that local context and the way it changes over time *does* matter to neighborhood politics. The broad economic trajectory of a city and its metropolitan region, the patterns of demographic change, and the extent and concentration of neighborhood distress may affect the political articulation of neighborhood concerns, as well as the scope and focus of responses to neighborhood distress.

In this chapter, we portray the evolving local social, economic and demographic contexts in our six study cities. We do so primarily by presenting statistical data on selected social, economic, and demographic variables. Our goal is not merely to describe individual variables. Instead, we examine how multiple social, economic and demographic variables cluster together in different patterns across our study cities to produce distinct contexts for neighborhood politics. Drawing on observations over time, we pay attention to the way in which these contexts have been changing over the last couple of decades in response to ongoing national and

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international processes of deindustrialization and globalization. Aggregating and interpreting the patterns across the data, we find that our study cities include three distinct types: the distressed former industrial city (Baltimore); the post-industrial boomtowns (Denver and Phoenix); and the globalized cities (Los Angeles and Toronto). Our sixth city, Chicago, is a hybrid, which has many of the traits of the globalized city, yet also harbors social distress characteristic of many older former industrial cities. It is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss the ways in which specific contexts affect the politics and policy of neighborhood regeneration – that task falls to the chapters that follow. But by identifying and characterizing different contexts in our case cities, this chapter provides a foundation for assessing the extent to which the local socioeconomic and demographic conditions, and the ways in which these conditions change over time, matter to neighborhood revitalization.

Before we present the data, a few words about scale are in order. While the case study chapters in this volume focus on politics in central cities, neither the context nor the politics of revitalization in these municipalities exist in isolation from factors that operate at broader spatial scales. Thus, for example, whether or not the broader metropolitan area in which a central city is located is economically growing or declining may have a significant impact on both the longer-term socioeconomic trajectory of the central city, and on neighborhood politics.¹ Likewise, knowing the poverty rate in a particular city is of limited value if we do not establish the broader context of the national poverty rate. The national context is all the more important for us because one of our case cities – Toronto – is in a different country, where not only are national-level socioeconomic and demographic trends different from the United States, but so is the methodology for measuring certain statistical indicators.² In order to place cities on a

¹ As of 2010, the percentage of the metropolitan area population living in our central cities ranged from a low of 22.9% in Baltimore to a high of 46.9% in Toronto. See Table 7.

² These methodological differences, where they exist, are discussed in notes to the statistical tables.

comparable basis, we thus present not only the absolute value our indicators in the various cities, but, where possible, we also present the values relative to those in the larger metropolitan area and the country as a whole.

Economic Trajectories in a Post-Industrial Era

In recent decades, the economic fortunes of all large North American cities, including the six that we examine in this book, have been shaped in varying ways by the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. In general, cities that were more heavily dependent on manufacturing have been more adversely affected than others, yet formerly industrial cities have also varied greatly in the extent to which they have successfully restructured their economic base by replacing lost manufacturing jobs with jobs in other sectors, and/or by integrating themselves into the global economy. These varying trajectories of restructuring have in turn shaped both the economic opportunities available to the poor and vulnerable residents who are at the center of our inquiry, and the resources available to local policy-makers.

Tables 2.1 and 2.2 trace the evolution of manufacturing employment in our cities between 1980 and 2009 at both the metropolitan and the central city levels. A quick glance at the tables reveals a striking trend away from manufacturing across all of our cities. Both the absolute number of people employed in manufacturing and the share of employment in manufacturing decreased in all of our cities, at both the central city and metropolitan scales. The decreases were steepest in the old manufacturing centers of Baltimore and Chicago, but almost equally steep in Denver and Phoenix (which were less dependent on industry in 1980, but almost were entirely deindustrialized by 2009). In Toronto and Los Angeles declines in manufacturing employment have also been notable, but both cities retain relatively large manufacturing sectors in comparison to our other cases. It is also notable that declines were steeper in the central city

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than in the metropolitan region, reflecting a trend toward suburbanization of manufacturing; that said, by the 2000-2009 period suburban areas in a number of our cities were deindustrializing just as rapidly as central city areas.

Table 2.1: Metropolitan Area Manufacturing Employment Trends, 1980 - 2009

Metropolitan Area	Manufacturing Employment as % of total employment, 1980	Manufacturing Employment as % of total employment, 2009	Percent change in Manufacturing Employment 1980-2009 ³
Baltimore	18.8	5.7	-61
Chicago	26.5	10.3	-50
Denver	14.7	5.8	-36
Los Angeles	25.8	10.3	-38
Phoenix	17.6	6.5	-9
Toronto	23 (1981)	13.5 (2006)	0 (81-06)
US	22.4	10.2	-35
Canada	19.2 (1981)	11.7 (2006)	-20 (81-06)

Sources: State of the Cities Data System: Characteristics of Workers by Place of Work, 1980. Data for 2009 comes from the OnTheMap database. US data are from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2002, table 591 (for 1980 data) and Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012, table 630 (for 2009). Toronto data are for 1981 and 2006, and are taken from Statistics Canada census tables.

Notes: Percent change in manufacturing employment 1980-2009 is calculated as: (total employment in manufacturing in 2009 in metro area – total employment manufacturing in 1980 in metro area) / total employment manufacturing in 1980 in metro area.

³These figures represent *absolute* change in numbers employed, rather than the relative share of overall employment (documented in the other columns). This is why the decreases observable across the initial columns do not correspond to the figures in this final column. The same applies in Table 2.

Table 2.2: City Manufacturing Employment Trends, 1980-2009

Cities	Manufacturing Employment as % of total employment, 1980	Manufacturing Employment as % of total employment, 2009	Percent change in Manufacturing Employment 1980-2009
Baltimore	18.9	4.5	-82
Chicago	23.2	5.5	-80
Denver	14.3	4.7	-64
Los Angeles	21.2	7.1	-66
Phoenix	19.3	4.8	-50
Toronto	24.5 (1981)	11.7 (2006)	-37 (81-06)
US	22.1	10.2	-35
Canada	19.2 (1981)	11.7 (2006)	-20% (81-06)

Sources: State of the Cities Data System: Characteristics of Workers by Place of Work, 1980. Data for 2009 comes from the OnTheMap database. US data from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2002, table 591 (for 1980, data) and Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012, table 630 (for 2009). Toronto and Canadian data are for 1981 and 2006, and are taken from Statistics Canada census tables.

The move to a post-industrial economy has often had wrenching consequences, particularly for those individuals with limited education and, therefore, limited access to the better-paid niches of the post-industrial labor market. Given the paramount importance of education, both for individual access to well-paid labor opportunities and for citywide prospects for post-industrial economic development, we present data on educational attainment in our central cities in Table 2.3. In general, the stronger a city's historical dependence on manufacturing (see Table 2.2), the weaker the educational attainment of its population. Baltimore stands out as consistently having the lowest educational attainment between 1990 and

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2010. Chicago – an old manufacturing center, like Baltimore – also had a workforce with limited education in 1990, but by 2010 it had closed the gap, and had actually outpaced Los Angeles. Denver and Toronto had the strongest educational attainment overall, while Los Angeles was characterized by rather bifurcated educational attainment, with high proportions both of those with no post-secondary education, and of those with a university bachelor’s degree or more. It is notable that all of our study cities saw significant improvement in educational attainment between 1990 and 2010.

Table 2.3: Central City Educational Attainment

	City % High School or Less 1990	City % High School or Less 2010	City % BA or Better 1990	City % BA or Better 2010
all US cities	51.6	42.9	23.0	28.1
Baltimore	66.8	52.6	15.5	24.2
Chicago	58.6	42.9	19.5	33.4
Denver	44.4	35.9	29.0	40.9
Los Angeles	52.2	45.2	23.0	30.7
Phoenix	46.8	45.1	19.9	24.9
Toronto	n.d.	33.6 (2006)	n.d.	37.4 (2006)

Sources: State of the Cities Data System; Statistics Canada census tables. Data for 2010 comes from the American Fact Finder 2. US numbers for 2010 correspond to the whole country.

Notes: BA = university bachelor’s degree. National percentages of high-school education or less and BA or better, used for calculations in columns 4 and 7, were 48.2% and 24.4%, respectively. Toronto data include individuals 25 years and older.

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The more dependent a city was on manufacturing, and the less well educated its workforce, the greater was the mismatch between worker skills and the human capital needs of a post-industrial economy. The consequences of this are borne out by unemployment and labor force participation data (see Table 2.4). Here we see the cities dividing into three basic groups. Unemployment has tended to be highest, and labor force participation lowest, in the old industrial cities (Chicago and Baltimore), suggesting difficult, socially wrenching economic transformations – although the figures for Chicago indicate a less painful trajectory than do those for Baltimore. By contrast, Denver and Phoenix, which were not as historically dependent on industry and which have relatively well-educated workforces, have tended to have the lowest unemployment and highest labor force participation among the American cities. Toronto and Los Angeles are between these two extremes, but their trajectories have recently diverged, as Los Angeles has been hard hit by recession, which Toronto weathered better than its American counterparts. Indeed, one of the most notable trends in our cities is the recent marked rise in unemployment in all of the US cities in our sample.

Table 2.4: City Resident Unemployment and Labor Force Participation Rates

City	Unemployment Rate, 1980 (%)	Unemployment Rate, 2010 (%)	Labor Force Participation Rate 1980 (%)	Labor Force Participation Rate 2010 (%)
US	7.1	10.8	63.8	64.4
Baltimore	10.7	14.4	57	61.4
Chicago	9.8	14.8	60.7	65.7
Denver	4.9	11.9	66.4	70.6
Los Angeles	6.8	13.0	64.6	66.6
Phoenix	5.5	11.5	66.2	65.4
Toronto	4.1 (1981)	9.9	70.0 (1981)	65.3

Sources: Data for 2010 from American Fact Finder 2. For US data for 1980, 1990 and 2000, Statistical Abstract 2002. Toronto data from Statistics Canada Census tables for 1981, and City of Toronto 2011 Labour Force Overview: http://www.toronto.ca/invest-in-toronto/labour_force_overview.htm.

Note: Labor force participation rate = Labor force / Population 16 years and over; Unemployment rate = Unemployed / Labor force.

The economic indicators we have presented so far suggest correlations between a city's historical dependence on manufacturing and the degree of difficulty it has faced in transitioning to a post-industrial economy. Does a similar pattern hold for globalization? The data in Table 2.5 suggest that the post-industrial transition and globalization are not always closely related phenomena. The Table ranks our study cities among the top 500 in the world in terms of their global economic competitiveness, using an index that combined a large number of global integration and competitiveness indicators.⁴

⁴ The indicators on which these rankings are based were measured at the metropolitan scale, so some caution is necessary when interpreting the results when compared with results from the preceding central city data. This is especially the case for Baltimore, whose central city economic trajectory is very different from that of the surrounding metropolitan area, and whose global competitiveness ranking would likely decrease in relative terms if it were measured at the level of the central city alone.

Table 2.5: Global Urban Competitiveness Rankings, 2011

	Chicago	Los Angeles	Toronto	Phoenix	Denver	Baltimore
Ranking	5	7	23	52	57	60

Source:http://books.google.com/books?id=fZyDiKw60IYC&pg=PA1&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false

In terms of global competitiveness, our study cities divide into two groups: a "first tier" of highly globalized, internationally competitive cities (Los Angeles, Chicago, and Toronto) and a "second tier" of less globalized cities (Baltimore, Denver, and Phoenix). Notably, the first tier contains one of the two old industrial cities (Chicago), while the second tier contains the other (Baltimore), as well as the two cities that were historically least dependent on industrial development (Denver and Phoenix). It is also notable that the three first tier cities are also the three that retained the highest percentage of industrial employment in both the central city and the metro region as of the year 2009. Clearly, then, trajectories of post-industrial transformation and of economic globalization are not necessarily congruent. In order to make more sense of this disjuncture, we turn now to demographic data on our cities.

Diverse Demographic Transformations

The economic changes described above have been accompanied by corresponding demographic changes. In North America, which has long been marked by modest levels of natural domestic population increase, the economic strength of a city and its consequent attractiveness to migrants and immigrants is a dominant driver of population change. Cities that offer economic opportunities attract both internal and international migrants, and grow rapidly in population as a result; conversely, cities in economic decline typically have either stagnant or declining populations. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 tell contrasting stories for our six study cities in this

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regard. The central cities of Baltimore and Chicago both reached the apogee of their industrial-era population around 1950. Since then, however, while both cities have experienced substantial population loss, their trajectories (Table 2.6) have diverged. Chicago, experienced a 20% decline in population up to 1990, but since then, its population has largely stabilized. Baltimore's painful deindustrialization has been accompanied by a steady, continuous, and deep population decline. Toronto and Los Angeles have followed a different trajectory, with rapid population growth during the early post-war decades that has tapered off into more modest growth in recent years. Finally, Denver and Phoenix both stand out as young boomtowns with steady population growth. In the case of Phoenix this growth was extraordinarily rapid until 2008, when it tapered off with the onset of the recession.

Table 2.6: City Population, 1950-2010

City	City population 1950	City population 1990	City population 2010	% City population change, 1950-2010	% City population change, 1990-2010
Baltimore	940,205	736,014	620,583	-33.99	-15.68
Chicago	3,606,436	2,783,726	2,698,831	-25.17	-3.05
Denver	412,856	467,610	604,414	46.40	29.26
Los Angeles	1,957,692	3,485,398	3,797,144	93.96	8.94
Phoenix	105,442	983,403	1,449,481	1274.67	47.39
Toronto	1,117,470	2,275,771	2,615,060	134.02	14.91

Sources: State of the Cities Data System for 2000; US Statistical Abstract, 1950 for 1950; American Fact Finder 2 for 2010. Statistics Canada census tables (1991, 2011); City of Toronto Archives (1951 data).
 Note: Toronto data are for 1951, 1991 and 2011. % city population change: 1950-2010= (city population 2010-city population 1950) / city population 1950.

The metropolitan-level data presented in Table 2.7 in some ways reinforce the trajectories identified for central cities, but they also add some important nuances. Rates of suburban population growth outpace rates of central city growth in all cases, such that central city populations have shrunk over time in proportion to metropolitan populations. Indeed, even in Baltimore, where the central city is marked by long-term population decline, the metropolitan area has continued to grow. When we combine this observation with the stark differences between central city and metropolitan poverty in Baltimore (see Table 2.1), as well as the heavy concentration of minority groups in the central city (see Table 2.8), a picture begins to emerge of Baltimore as a central city deeply disconnected from its own (prosperous and growing) metropolitan hinterland. Similar but less dramatic gaps in contextual profile emerge in the case of Chicago as well. It is also worth noting that Toronto, which has had only modest central city population growth in recent years, continues to experience rapid growth in the wider metropolitan area.

Table 2.7: City as a % of Metropolitan Area Population

City	Metro population 1990	Metro Population 2010	City population as a % of metro, 1990	City population as a % of metro, 2010
Baltimore	2,382,508	2,714,183	30.9	22.9
Chicago	8,182,076	9,474,211	34	28.5
Denver	1,666,973	2,560,529	28.1	23.6
Los Angeles	11,273,720	12,849,383	30.9	29.6
Phoenix	2,238,480	4,211,213	43.9	34.4
Toronto	3,893,046	5,583,064	58.5	46.9

Source: State of the Cities Data System; American Fact Finder 2 for 2010 data. Toronto data: Statistics Canada census tables. Notes: Toronto data are for 1991 and 2011.

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The economic and social histories of our study cities are also inscribed in the ethno-racial make-up of their populations. As Table 2.8 shows, Baltimore and Chicago both have very large African-American populations, a legacy of African-American migration to centers of industrial employment during the early 20th century. By contrast, in the other three American cities African-American populations are smaller, and the dominant ethnic minority group is Hispanic, reflecting patterns of migration and immigration to more recently growing cities. Chicago appears to be a hybrid case, however, in that it also has a large Hispanic population, reflecting its relative attractiveness to migrants in recent decades in comparison with Baltimore. Along with Toronto (see Table 2.9), whose ethno-racial composition is very different from that of any of the American case cities and is assessed using different categories, Chicago is thus the most distinctly multiracial city among our cases.

There are also systematic correlations between ethno-racial composition and the depth of a city-suburb difference in ethno-racial make-up across the cities. The old industrial cities of Baltimore and Chicago have by far the largest gap between minority-dominated central cities and white-dominated suburbs, reflecting the historical dynamics of ‘white flight’ and entrenched racial prejudice against African-Americans⁵. By contrast, in more multiracial cities with larger populations of recent immigrants, such city-suburb differences still exist, but they tend to be much smaller. Indeed, in the globalized cities of Los Angeles and Toronto, the suburbs are nearly as ethno-racially diverse as the central city itself.

⁵ It should be noted, however, that the demographic pattern in the Chicago region is undergoing change with suburbs gaining in diversity; see Hanlon, Short, and Vicino (2010).

Table 2.8: Racial Composition, City and Suburbs – US Cities, 2010

City	City % white alone	City % Black	City % Asian	City % Other	City % Hispanic	Suburban % white alone	Suburban % Black	Suburban % Asian	Suburban % Other	Suburban % Hispanic
Baltimore	28.04	63.28	2.32	0.49	4.18	69.49	18.03	5.16	0.45	4.68
Chicago	31.71	32.36	5.38	0.33	28.89	64.29	10.96	5.65	0.28	17.42
Denver	52.15	9.73	3.32	0.87	31.82	70.02	3.96	3.71	0.72	19.56
Los Angeles	28.66	9.16	11.08	0.61	48.48	32.87	5.66	15.91	0.71	42.74
Phoenix	46.52	6.00	3.04	1.91	40.80	65.08	3.88	3.29	2.30	23.51

Source: State of the Cities Data System; American Fact Finder 2 for 2010 data. ‘Suburbs’ are defined as the Census Metropolitan Area minus the central city.

Table 2.9: Largest ‘Visible Minority’ Populations in Toronto, City and Suburbs, 2006

	Not visible minority	All visible minority	South Asian	Chinese	Black	Filipino	Latin American
City	53.05%	46.95%	12.05%	11.43%	8.42%	4.14%	2.62%
Suburbs	64.12%	35.88%	14.80%	7.79%	5.50%	2.66%	1.32%

Source: Calculated from Statistics Canada Census tables.

Notes: ‘Visible minority’ is a category in the Canadian census that is reported separately from specific ethno-racial background. ‘Suburbs’ are defined as the Census Metropolitan Area minus the central city.

In recent decades, most of the population growth among urban minority groups in North America has been driven by immigration. As Table 2.10 shows, all of our cities have recently experienced growth in immigrant populations, but the percentage of foreign born residents varies tremendously, from a modest 7.1% in Baltimore (2010) to nearly half, 49.98%, in the City of Toronto (2006). Interestingly, while central cities have more foreign born residents than metropolitan areas in all of our cases except Baltimore, the differences across these two scales

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are fairly modest and have decreased over time in all cases except that of Phoenix. In other words, immigrants to our cities have settled in the suburbs almost as much as they have in the central cities.

Table 2.10: % Foreign Born

City	City % Foreign Born 1990	City % Foreign Born 2010	Suburbs % Foreign Born 1990	Suburbs % Foreign Born 2010	City: Suburbs Ratio 1990	City: National Ratio 1990	City: Suburbs Ratio 2010	City: National Ratio 2010
National (US)	12.50							
Baltimore	3.20	7.1	3.88	9.9	0.83	0.256	0.72	0.567
Chicago	16.90	20.7	7.93	16.4	2.13	1.352	1.26	1.653
Denver	7.40	16.3	3.60	11.1	2.05	0.592	1.47	1.300
Los Angeles	38.40	39.1	25.89	32.3	1.48	3.072	1.21	3.131
Phoenix	8.60	20.0	6.43	11.5	1.34	0.688	1.73	1.597
Toronto	n.d.	49.98 (2006)	n.d.	41.48 (2006)	n.d.	n.d.	1.20 (2006)	2.52 (2006)

Sources: State of the Cities Data System for 1990, American Fact Finder 2 for 2010; National foreign born population in 1990 from Statistical Abstract 2002, table No. 41. Statistics Canada census tables.

Notes: Overall US national foreign born population (used for calculation in last column) was 19,767,000 in 1990 and 39,955,854 in 2010. Overall Canadian national foreign born population was 6,186,950 (19.8%) in 2006.

This pattern underlines the fact that the large city-metro disparities in the percentage of non-white residents in some of our cases (see Table 2.8) are due primarily to the historical dynamics of spatial segregation between whites and African-Americans. In other words, longstanding dynamics of city-suburb racial segregation persist, despite the broader immigration-driven metropolitanization of ethno-racial diversity. In addition, it is important to note that within central cities themselves, ethno-racial spatial segregation also exists, although it

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varies widely across our cases. While such within-city patterns of segregation are discussed in detail for each city in the chapters that follow this one, Table 2.11 indicates that Chicago, Baltimore, and Los Angeles have much greater levels of Black-White segregation than do Denver and Phoenix, although in the case of all five cities, segregation levels have declined modestly between 1990 and 2010.

Table 11: Black-White Segregation in U.S. Cities (Racial Dissimilarity Indexes⁶)

City	1990	2010
Baltimore	75.9	68.9
Chicago	87.4	82.5
Denver	67.0	54.7
Los Angeles	78.4	66.9
Phoenix	55.8	49.9

Source: Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences, Brown University.

The percentage of foreign born residents in our cities maps quite closely onto the diverse economic trajectories and levels of global integration identified earlier. Baltimore, a distressed older industrial city with relatively low global integration, has by far the lowest percentage of foreign born residents. Chicago, an old industrial city that has become highly globally integrated, has moderate numbers of foreign born residents. Los Angeles and Toronto, both

⁶ Black-White racial disparity indexes measure the percentage of the Black population in the city that would have to move in order that each city census tract would have the same percentage of Blacks in the population relative to Whites. Higher numbers thus indicate greater segregation.

economically diverse and highly integrated global cities, have very high percentages of foreign born residents. Finally, Denver and Phoenix, both fast- growing post-industrial boomtowns with relatively low global integration, have moderate but rapidly increasing numbers of foreign born residents.

The Evolution and Concentration of Social Distress

The economic and demographic changes that we have described have been accompanied by the emergence of new forms and geographies of social distress in many cities. Social distress is a multifaceted phenomenon that can be measured using a variety of indicators. However, poverty rates are the most common metric, so we focus on that (Table 2.12). All of our central cities have poverty rates well above the national poverty rate (which was 15.3% for the US in 2010). Baltimore has had the highest central city poverty rate among our six cities in recent decades, although Chicago and Los Angeles are not far behind. By contrast, Phoenix and Denver historically had rather low central city poverty rates, but with the recent economic downturn their rates have increased markedly in recent years. The particularly steep increase in poverty in central Phoenix reflects the deep impact of the 2008-2009 recession, but both Phoenix and Denver are also subject to broader periodic boom and bust cycles. Central city poverty in Toronto has also increased markedly in recent years, and appears to be rather high in relation to the other cities. However, Canadian methodology for determining poverty rates is different (see note to Table 2.12) and is likely to produce higher percentages than U.S. methodology would.

Table 2.12: City and Suburban Poverty Rate

City	City Poverty Rate 1989	Suburban Poverty Rate 1989	City Poverty Rate 2010	Suburban Poverty Rate 2010	City: Suburban Poverty Rate 1989	City: Suburban Poverty Rate 2010
Baltimore	21.9%	4.80%	25.6%	6.7%	4.53	3.80
Chicago	21.6%	6.00%	22.5%	10.0%	3.61	2.24
Denver	17.1%	6.80%	21.6%	9.7%	2.51	2.22
Los Angeles	18.9%	13.40%	21.6%	14.0%	1.41	1.54
Phoenix	14.2%	11.90%	22.5%	13.0%	1.2	1.73
Toronto	16.3% (1991)	6.00% (1991)	24.5% (2006)	12.5% (2006)	2.72 (1991)	1.96 (2006)

Sources: State of the Cities Data System for 1989; American Fact Finder 2 for 2010. Statistics Canada census tables, 1991 and 2006.

Notes: The U.S. national poverty rate was 12.8% in 1989 and 15.3% in 2010. Poverty rate is calculated as the number of people below the poverty line from the total number of people for whom poverty status is determined. Suburban figures are calculated as the figures for the metropolitan area minus the figures from the Canadian city figures show the percentage of “Low Income Families”; this is calculated using a low-income cut-off that varies geographically by cost of living.

Setting central city poverty rates in their metropolitan contexts, we see that all of our cities are, on average, poorer than the overall metropolitan areas in which they are situated. Yet the disparities differ greatly. In Baltimore, Chicago, and to a lesser extent Denver, the central city is much poorer than the metropolitan area as a whole. Baltimore in particular stands out here as a highly distressed central city situated in a prosperous metropolitan area. In Los Angeles, Phoenix and Toronto, by contrast, the differences are more modest. And in Denver, with gentrification on the increase, the contrast may be declining as well.

Turning to the concentration of poverty in specific neighborhoods (see Table 2.13) we find a rather different set of patterns emerging. In general, cities with higher overall poverty rates (Table 2.12) have also had metropolitan areas with higher rates of concentrated poverty in recent decades (concentrated poverty rates for individual cities are not available, but we assume

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that most areas of concentrated poverty in metropolitan areas are located in central cities). However, there are striking exceptions to this trend. In 1989-90, for example, Los Angeles had an overall poverty rate close to that of Chicago and Baltimore, yet it had the lowest rate of concentrated poverty. By 2000, however, Los Angeles had the highest concentrated poverty of all the American cities. Perhaps the most notable pattern in Table 2.13 involves the large magnitude of change in levels of concentrated poverty. Four of our six cities experienced a major decline in concentrated poverty between 1990 and 2000, which correlates with the broader U.S. trend during this time, whereas two (Los Angeles and Toronto) experienced a significant rise.

Table 2.13: Neighborhoods of Concentrated Poverty

City	Neighborhoods of concentrated poverty 1990	Neighborhoods of concentrated poverty 2000	Concentrated Poverty Rate 1990	Concentrated Poverty Rate 2000	Percentage point change 1990-2000
National (US)			15.1	10.3	-4.8
Baltimore	38	33	22.5	13.5	-9.0
Chicago	187	114	26.4	13.7	-12.8
Denver	11	2	7.6	1.5	-6.1
Los Angeles	56	137	9.0	14.9	5.9
Phoenix	27	30	15.2	10.5	-4.7
Toronto	66	120	13.9	23.0	9.1

Source for US metropolitan areas: Jargowsky, 2003. Source for Toronto: United Way 2004.

Note: US data are for metropolitan areas, whereas Toronto data are for the central city. Toronto data are for 1991 and 2001; they are for census tracts. A census tract is defined as having 'concentrated poverty' if it has more than double the Canadian national average family poverty rate (12.8% in 2001). Concentrated poverty rate is the percentage of total people in poverty who are living in areas of concentrated poverty.

When we integrate these data on poverty with data on ethno-racial composition presented earlier, some remarkable patterns are evident. For example, city/suburban poverty rates map closely on to city/metro disparities in the percentage of nonwhite residents. Baltimore and Chicago, the two cities with the highest city/suburban poverty disparity, are also the two cities that concentrate racial minorities in the center. By contrast, Los Angeles and Toronto have the lowest city/suburban disparities on both of these indicators. While our sample of cities is rather small, these data nonetheless provide evidence for the continued role that the spatial and social segregation of African-Americans plays in the reproduction of social distress in American cities (see also Sampson 2012). That said, our data also suggest caution in assuming that concentration of distress among immigrant minority groups is therefore not a significant concern. Indeed, it is remarkable that Toronto and Los Angeles, the two cities with the most intensive global economic connections and the largest immigrant populations, are also the only ones in which concentrated poverty increased between 1990 and 2000 (Table 2.13). This suggests that immigration and global integration may attenuate long established patterns of urban socio-spatial segregation, only to replace them with new patterns of segregation and inequality.

The Contextual Trajectories of Six Cities: A Brief Profile

The cities examined in this book set a variety of very different contexts for the politics and policy of neighborhood revitalization. The data on social distress, economic trajectories and demographic change we have presented here display clear patterns, with variables clustering together in complex but ordered ways, such that we can identify types of contextual trajectories among our case cities. In this section we briefly review these contextual types, organizing our discussion from the most to the least socially distressed.

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In the data we have presented here, Baltimore stands out clearly as having the most socially distressed context for neighborhood policymaking. As an older industrial city, Baltimore has suffered decades of economic and population decline. It has persistently high rates of poverty and unemployment. Poverty is highly concentrated in particular neighborhoods, even though housing is relatively inexpensive. Baltimore is situated within a broader metropolitan area which is prosperous and growing, and accentuated by its proximity to Washington D.C. Yet the central city is fundamentally disconnected from this broader metropolitan context in terms of its socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. This deep disconnect reflects, in part, a stark and enduring racial divide between a relatively affluent white population, which is now largely suburban, and a largely poor African-American population, which continues to be concentrated in the central city. Despite the affluence of its suburbs, the Baltimore area displays rather low levels of global economic integration, and receives few new immigrants. In short, Baltimore is a clear example of a distressed former industrial city.

In historical terms, Chicago's socioeconomic trajectory is in many ways similar to Baltimore's. A long-standing major industrial center with a large African-American population, Chicago still displays many of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of an old American industrial city in the post-industrial era, including high rates of poverty and unemployment and an economic and racial gulf between the city and the suburbs. Yet in other ways Chicago is very much unlike Baltimore. It has become a highly globally integrated city with a strong post-industrial economic base, which sustains modest population growth, and has developed an increasingly diverse population base due to steady immigration. At the same time, Chicago has seen a rapid decline in concentrated poverty, despite a housing market that places a

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high cost burden on low-income residents. Chicago, then, is something of an unusual hybrid: an older industrial center that is reinventing itself as a global city.

Los Angeles and Toronto, for all their differences, share a broadly similar contextual trajectory. Both have histories of long-term rapid population growth, although in recent years central city growth has slowed, and only Toronto maintains rapid growth at the metropolitan scale. Both have long had a substantial industrial base, but have recently transitioned to diversified post-industrial economies. Despite their economic strength, both cities also have significant and growing concentrated poverty. In contrast in particular to Baltimore Los Angeles and Toronto do not display the large city-suburban disparities in poverty and ethno-racial composition that mark many older American industrial centers. Toronto and Los Angeles are both highly globally integrated cities, which stand out among our cases for their very large immigrant populations. High immigration has also made them multiracial cities, although Los Angeles has one dominant minority group (Hispanics), whereas Toronto does not. In short, Los Angeles and Toronto present a common type of context for neighborhood policy and politics, that of the globalized city.

Finally, Denver and Phoenix share a similar contextual trajectory. Both are younger, rapidly growing cities with low dependence on industry and a diversified post-industrial economic base. Both have historically had relatively low levels of poverty and concentrated poverty. However, both cities— most especially Phoenix – were hit hard by the recession of 2008-2009, which is reflected in a rapid rise in poverty and unemployment in recent years. Both Phoenix and Denver also have rapidly growing immigrant populations, mainly composed of migrants from Mexico and Latin America. While both Denver and Phoenix display wealth gaps that disadvantage the central city in relation to the broader metropolitan area, these gaps are

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smaller than in old industrial centers. Despite their rapid growth trajectories, neither Denver nor Phoenix is highly integrated into the global economy. They might best be characterized as post-industrial boomtowns, subject to periodic boom and bust cycles.

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Endnotes to Chapter 2