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Chapter 5

Through A Glass Darkly: The Once and Future Study of Urban Politics

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In a shift from “the lost world of municipal government” to the field now known as urban politics, several major figures in political science played large roles.¹ Among them were such prominent scholars as Robert A. Dahl, Wallace S. Sayre, Herbert Kaufman, Edward C. Banfield, and James Q. Wilson.² Yet the school of thought to which these works contributed so heavily, classic pluralism, was not the main foundation on which subsequent urban scholarship built. Hindsight tells us that the supposedly golden age bore little long-lasting fruit. A notable point is how modestly the classics contributed to the field in its present form.

Whereas pluralism failed to provide an instructive theoretical lens to guide research in the years that followed, a conceptual shift to urban political economy proved to be far more fertile. Still, with ongoing evolution in the urban condition, it may now be time for a theoretical refocusing. Hence in this chapter we look back critically at the ways in city politics has been studied. In particular we see a need to discard some past assumptions, rethink the nature of political change, and give more attention to politically marginal segments of the urban population, and consider what their position can tell us about the nature of the urban political order.

While important insights have been gained over the years, the quest for an adequate theoretical lens continues. Our aim here is to identify some promising elements for a research framework for the future. We do this in three steps. One is to examine shortcomings in classic works. The second is to revisit briefly urban political economy

studies from the 1970s on and to take stock of some of their strengths and weaknesses. In this vein we recast the position of the urban-regime concept to place it in a more explicit historical context. The third is to look at the urban political order from the bottom up and focus on the *interpenetrations* of government, civil society, and the economy. Here we ask why marginality persists in a formally democratic system and are there prospects for change.

As a promising alternative to past frameworks, we suggest American political development (APD), chiefly as set forth by Orren and Skowronek.³ Whereas pluralism assumes a highly autonomous process of politics⁴ and urban political economy privileges the causal force of the economic system, APD offers a polity-centered approach in which politics is thoroughly interwoven with the economic *and social* features of a complex body of arrangements for governing. It cautions us to be wary of pursuing parsimony at the cost of adequacy of explanation.⁵ An important new body of urban history powerfully reinforces APD on this and other points.

With links to historical sociology and insights from C. Wright Mills,⁶ Orren and Skowronek first of all warn against any notion of a monocausal process of development. As they put it, “master ideas or processes alleged to arrange political affairs for extended periods of time” should be viewed with skepticism.⁷ Orren and Skowronek offer the alternative of ‘intercurrence’—the coexistence of multiple orders, typically originating at different times and in tension with one another—as a focal concern. Thus their polity-centered approach forecloses any inclination toward social or economic determinism.

As a way out of endless complexity, Orren and Skowronek suggest that analytical efforts center on “durable shifts in governing authority.”⁸ However, a caution we offer

on that score is to avoid embracing a narrow conception of authority by linking it too closely to the formal actions of government. Orren and Skowronek, for example, talk about making use of paper trails in tracing the evolution of governing institutions. We counter with the reminder that for a thoroughly polity-centered approach a paper trail is apt to be inadequate.⁹ Especially in local politics, much is done by means of tacit understandings that may be thinly documented in formal sources.

By bringing these various strands of analysis together and tracking major shifts in governance, we get a fresh look at the political development of cities. What Robert Salisbury once called “the new convergence of power”—a main street/city hall coalition around the reshaping of the central city—was at the heart of a post World War II shift in how U.S. cities are governed.¹⁰ It was also a shift that accentuated the political marginality of substantial segments of the population. Now, more than a half century later, it seems appropriate to consider whether urban politics is entering a new phase that could culminate in yet another shift. If so, what are its markers? We believe that APD offers an instructive perspective in responding to that question.

Classic Pluralism

When classic pluralism emerged as the discipline’s dominant paradigm,¹¹ it bore the strong markings of a passive 1950s and provided little insight into the oncoming period of social turmoil and urban disorder. Although talk of an urban crisis had surfaced by the 1950s, the main thrust of pluralism was to celebrate American politics as widely representative and American political practice as highly resilient. Nothing seemed amiss in the capacity of cities to meet the kinds of change becoming evident. As the 1960s further unfolded, for the champions of pluralism underlying assumptions continued to

trump observable reality.¹² Thomas Kuhn tells us that an established paradigm does not readily yield to emergent anomalies. So it was with pluralism. It is instructive, then, to see what pluralism encompassed and examine the assumptions it rested on.

Who Governs? was the most elaborately theoretical of the city studies.¹³ For Dahl the finding that cities like New Haven are not governed by a covert ruling elite is only the surface of a complex body of political explanation. As viewed by Dahl, a change process gave birth to pluralism; it emerged from a transformation in society, often given the shorthand of modernization. Over time politics ceased to be an arena of deference to society's patrician class and instead became an autonomous process centered on popular elections. In Dahl's treatment, modernization meant that increased democratization of elections combined with role differentiation to replace rule by notables.¹⁴ With political activity severed from both social notability and business leadership, this separation of society's major functional roles dispersed power in such a way that no one group could exercise control, but many groups could defend their immediate interests. Overarching control was made difficult by the fact that different groups had varying power resources. Wealth, technical expertise, and popularity each advantaged a different sector of society. In the pluralist narrative the political danger was not domination, but immobility from the fragmentation of a highly differentiated society.¹⁵

Dahl's pluralism has a further layer. Embedded in *Who Governs?* is a Parsonian form of structural functionalism.¹⁶ Consider how consensus on fundamentals fits into Dahl's overall scheme of things. According to Dahl, New Haven had a "prevailing system of beliefs to which all the major groups in the community subscribe."¹⁷ With consensus at work, conflict was confined to narrow gauge and shifting issues. As Dahl

read the situation, a skillful leader like Mayor Richard Lee could pursue a large-scale, public-minded agenda. According to Dahl, Mayor Lee benefited from a trend in which there was a shift in political orientation from highly particular to collective benefits. This trend enabled the spread of policies that “emphasized shared benefits to citizens in general rather than to specific categories.”¹⁸ Banfield/Wilson talked of a parallel move from a private-regarding to a public-regarding ethos. In both instances a broad consensus and collective benefits rested on a process of growing assimilation into the middle class and its values.

Role differentiation and value consensus were thus essential counterweights to one another, and both were vital elements in modernization. Standing alone, role differentiation could lead to an inability to govern. Thus, in the pluralist model of politics, the two elements combined with elections to assure that power would be dispersed, but without undoing the capacity of the community to govern itself. Elections, role differentiation, and consensus combined provide a form of governing both widely representative and effective in problem-solving.¹⁹

In Dahl’s New Haven study, the testing of the pluralist model was selective, and several of its assumptions went largely unexamined. Key findings included: (1) efforts to exert influence largely followed lines of policy specialization; (2) public officials, not economic elites, made the major explicit decisions; and (3) mayoral officeholders evolved over time from notables to those who possessed common-touch popularity (often with an immigrant-stock/ethnic dimension). For a complicated theoretical argument, this constitutes quite limited empirical support.

Assumptions were more wide-ranging: (1) politics is an autonomous process largely independent of social and economic inter-penetrations by economic and social factors;²⁰ (2) however, political development is driven by a master process of modernization; (3) since elections are the central political process and determine who holds the key positions of authority, the outcome of mayoral contests track the flow of power over time; (4) decision outcomes indicate power; (5) legal authority is especially important and through the actions of elected office-holders widely responsive to citizen concerns;²¹ (6) rising levels of education and income bring about assimilation into a middle-class system of values, and, through accompanying forms of socialization, individuals become value carriers. All in all, despite a degree of complexity, this model rests on a narrow conception of what is politically relevant and how.

Urban Political Economy

As the 1960s unfolded and then gave way to the 1970s, the tenets of pluralism proved to be sharply at odds with the flow of events. Conflict was patently not confined to low-key, narrow-gauge issues; a deep racial divide became evident;²² belying the notion of a deep consensus, and a postreform politics of fractured interests and identities thoroughly eclipsed the notion that public mindedness was on the rise.²³ New York City's fiscal crisis of 1975 provided a focusing event, not just putting economic issues in the forefront, but dispelling the notion of an autonomous politics. With a Financial Control Board in charge of ameliorating the city's debt crisis, the role of economic elites no longer appeared remote and minor.

Political economy nudged pluralism off center stage, and attention gravitated toward James O'Connor's depiction of modern democratic politics as caught in an

unresolvable tension between the accumulation needs of capital and the state's needs for popular legitimacy.²⁴ Instead of consensus, O'Connor posited endemic conflict. And Ira Katznelson put forward the critical view that ruling forces employed social-control mechanisms that are neither spontaneous nor benign.²⁵

Whereas pluralists Sayre and Kaufman had depicted a New York City in which service-demanders held the upper hand over revenue-providers, urban scholars became increasingly concerned with the economic basis of revenue production. Recovering pluralist Charles Lindblom put forward the idea that an unrelenting need for investment in economic growth gave business a "privileged position" in public affairs.²⁶ Debate began to center on the question of how much slack there might be in what Jones and Bachelor termed "the social cables that bind the local polity and the local economy."²⁷ Martin Shefter published a seminal article in which the need to win elections had to contend with multiple and not easily reconciled imperatives. In addition to winning elections, urban politicians encounter needs to promote the city's economic health and preserve the city's credit, contain group conflicts, and maintain social peace generally.²⁸

Although the notion of an autonomous political process lingered with Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's *Protest Is Not Enough*,²⁹ Paul Peterson's *City Limits* provided an influential counter-point.³⁰ Peterson argued that city politics was largely determined by the economically competitive position of localities within a federal system, a system that did little to provide financial equalization. For Peterson, the overriding interest of the city in responding to this competition trumped other policy considerations. As a form of economic determinism, Peterson's book launched a still unresolved debate about the interplay between structure and agency.³¹ And with cities undergoing a transition from

an industrial era to a post-industrial period, the economic imperative to pursue growth claimed a place (although disputed in its particulars) at the center of the urban political stage that it still holds.³² Counter to Peterson's view that policy choices are driven by a shared economic need among city inhabitants, sociologist Harvey Molotch argued that city policy often emanates from efforts by "the growth machine," a self-serving coterie of business interests organized to pursue private profit-making by a narrowly conceived form of development.³³

The arrival of a political-economy perspective also put the city in a wider context of national policy and a global economy.³⁴ Significant European interest was also stirred in the idea of the entrepreneurial city and the challenge of analyzing changing forms of governance.³⁵ The need to bridge the gap between the city's need for a favorable business climate with the reality of popular elections and an ever-tenuous hold on social peace gave birth to the concept of regime politics in its various manifestations. We turn to that below, but first consider major aspects of urban political economy as an alternative to pluralism as an approach to the study of city politics: (1) The context of a capitalist economy is fundamentally important; (2) far from being autonomous, politics is powerfully linked to the economy; (3) a major concern is how the economic imperative to pursue growth is interpreted, applied, and balanced against other considerations; (4) a pluralist understanding of modernization gives way to a developmental perspective centered on political-economic relations; (5) rejection of benign consensus and encompassing assimilation in favor of an open-ended potential for conflict and for biased and contested social control; and (6) replacement conceptually of actors as carriers of

values acquired through socialization by actors as agents embedded in structures while also engaged in situationally specific struggles.

While differing from pluralism in several aspects, an urban political-economy approach constitutes no tightly conceived paradigm. Instead it harbors competing schools of thought. One version puts features of the capitalist economy as the encompassing explanatory core. Consider Jason Hackworth's study, in which he posits a formidable neoliberalism project. In this treatment, while neoliberalism does not inevitably triumph as a result of features of global capitalism, it fosters a policy agenda and supporting ideology "engineered by external institutions that have no formal governing role in any municipality."³⁶ Through gate keeping in the capital market, these institutions discipline localities into conformity with neoliberalism. Resistance is possible but not easily sustained.

Though it centers on political struggle, Hackworth's analysis is tied closely to the nature of the economy—so much so that he takes regime analysis to task for its "extra-economic bias." This version of urban political economy is thus fiercely at odds with a polity-centered approach found in APD. Note also that it differs from Peterson's market-driven determinism. Whereas Peterson sees the market in play as an autonomous (non-political) set of forces operating strictly on principles of supply and demand, Hackworth views the market as a framework within which a political struggle occurs among an unevenly matched set of contenders. To him, neo-liberalism is a political project pursued by powerful interests seeking to shape capitalism in a particular way, a way that evokes resistance, albeit a resistance that is often not highly effective.

Strengths and Limitations in Urban-Regime Analysis

In its various forms, urban-regime analysis grew out of an urban political-economy approach, but can gain from a widened scope of analysis. Its point of departure is the need to bridge the divide between private control of investment and popular control of public office.³⁷ Martin Shefter's antecedent work on Tammany Hall was in that vein, as he examined competing political mobilizations in 19th century New York and gave close attention to variations in political and business alliances and their consequences. One thrust of his analysis was notably to dismiss the phenomenon of a value-carrying populace as a political determinant. He saw the masses as divided, not by a value orientation based in social characteristics, but by appeals delivered by competing, but elite-led forms of mobilization. In his words: "mass political behavior occurs not in a vacuum but rather within the structure of alternatives established by political elites in the course of their struggles with one another for positions, precedence, and power."³⁸ The alternatives in 19th century New York represented sharply different policy values, but they also involved competing strategies for winning support from the populace, strategies that included efforts to shape civil society so as to enlist political support. Thus in important regards, Shefter's analysis anticipates the polity-centered approach of Orren and Skowronek. Mobilization involved social relationships and alliances with economic elites as well as simple electoral appeals

An interpenetration of civil society and political activity is also displayed plainly in sociologist Robert Crain's analysis of the politics of school desegregation.³⁹ Crain found that a city's experience with desegregation depended on how a community's civic elites align with school politics. If they were engaged, as in places like Atlanta and Baltimore, the process went peacefully. If they were disengaged, as in places like Boston

and New Orleans, the process deteriorated readily into violence. Unrestrained political activists exploited racial hostility to garner support with little concern for wider or long-term consequences.⁴⁰

It is no surprise, then, that Stone's regime analysis of Atlanta's biracial coalition was drawn toward a consideration of the interpenetration of that city's civic structure and political activity.⁴¹ Biracial cooperation was mediated through extensive civic networks, and the prominent role of business in agenda-setting rested heavily on a thorough-going connection between civil society and political activity.⁴² As Stone observed:

if one is seeking credit, donations, technical expertise, prestigious endorsements, organizational support, business contacts, media backing, or in-depth analyses of problems, then very likely one is thrown into contact with the civic network that emanates from the activities of the downtown business elite.⁴³

Atlanta's biracial regime was thus much more than a simple accommodation between elected officeholders and the controllers of investment capital, and "the city too busy to hate" had an agenda far more expansive than simply economic growth.

In its most general terms, Stone defines an urban regime as an informal arrangement for governing. As such, a strong regime has a capacity to pursue a priority agenda by relying on a cross-sector coalition of the kind that first can provide the multiple resources needed for addressing a top policy priority and second that can devise a mode of cooperation and coordination to keep a governing coalition active and aligned behind its agenda. Put into historical context, this conception of governing turns out to be particularly useful for examining U.S. cities as they embarked on a widespread effort to redevelop and accommodate to deep-running changes in the urban economy.

Let's return to the theme of "the new convergence of power." It came together in the post WWII period. This is the period when the automobile became *overwhelmingly* dominant and suburbs grew very rapidly. It thus became a time that brought business leaders concerned over the fate of the central business district together with politicians anxious about the city's economic future. It is also a period in Chicago, New Haven, Boston, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and many other places in which patronage-oriented politicians and reform-minded business executives put away their past antagonisms and formed a strategic alignment. The structure of governance shifted, and in various configurations, "the new convergence" came together to alter land use, embrace the expressway, and promote a different kind of central business district.

Originating more than a half century ago, "the new convergence" is no longer new and shows signs of fading. But, if we turn the clock back a few decades, we can see that the post WWII struggle to reshape the city brought a political era centered on machine-versus-reform politics to a close. A radically reconfigured alliance took its place. In his famous study of New Haven, Robert Dahl called that city's version of an emergent arrangement "the executive-centered coalition." Richard Lee, the mayor of New Haven in that period, described his city's governing alliance this way:

We've got the biggest muscles, the biggest set of muscles in New Haven....
They're muscular because they control wealth; they're muscular because they control industries, represent banks. They're muscular because they head up labor. They're muscular because they represent the intellectual portions of the community. They're muscular because they're articulate, because they're respectable, because of their financial power, and because of the accumulation of

prestige which they have built up over the years as individuals in all kinds of causes whether United Fund, Red Cross or whatever (quoted in Dahl 1961: 130).

Consider this period through APD eyes. The “new convergence” constituted a durable shift in governing arrangements. Politics realigned. Yet, as suggested by Orren and Skowronek, multiple orders coexisted. New Haven illustrates the pattern. In order to pursue a far-reaching redevelopment agenda, Mayor Lee not only needed a muscular coalition of cross-sector membership, he also had to devise a mode of coexistence between the old and the new. He did this by constituting the redevelopment agency as an independent body answerable to the mayor but not the board of aldermen, an arrangement that was feasible because the agency’s work was funded mainly by federal and foundation grants. Thus the board of aldermen was largely frozen out of the redevelopment arena, but, as Dahl reports, Mayor Lee could not extend his policy reach by gaining approval for a new city charter. Old and new forms operated side by side, with the mayor’s executive authority greatly constrained over wide areas of governance.⁴⁴

The “new convergence” remade cities physically but left social reconstruction largely unaddressed. Moreover, it left a legacy of racial divide and grassroots distrust for authority.⁴⁵ As sociologist Mary Pattillo observes of the Chicago neighborhood she studied, “the ghost of urban renewal is always present.”⁴⁶ The same could be said of communities across the country and overseas as well.^{47 48}

The regime concept captures well the construction of muscular coalitions for redevelopment. However, with its focus on convergence at the top, it largely left out of the picture the grassroots and how they coped with a remade, post-industrial city. Ward-based organizations and neighborhood political clubs eventually gave way to new forms

of political organization and various ways of coping with and responding to political marginality by those on the lower rungs of the ladder of social stratification. There are a few exceptions in urban political science,⁴⁹ but much has been left unexamined. The initial move of urban-regime analysis toward exploring the inter-penetrations of government, market, and civil society needs to be extended. What about accommodations when the action agenda falls well below priority status and people have to cope with limited resources, marginal standing, and a lack of sustained attention from top leaders? Here is where a polity-centered approach could be enormously helpful, but official documents are likely to be much less useful than the insights gained from ethnographic studies and observations of and by grassroots groups and those working at the street level. What lines of connection extend across the boundaries of race and class? What does the political order look like from the bottom up? This is the view that is most likely to tell us whether a new order is in the making.

Thinking about Civil Society from the Bottom Up

With an assumption that government and politics constitute an autonomous activity, classic pluralism never found a bridge to two landmark studies of civil society, also of an early 1960s vintage. *The Life and Death of Great American Cities*, a critique of planning professionals, by author and activist Jane Jacobs came out the same year as *Who Governs?*.⁵⁰ The following year sociologist Herbert Gans published *The Urban Villagers*, a look at life in a working-class neighborhood and why urban renewal was socially injurious.⁵¹ With their highly critical stances, both books offered compelling reasons to question that a pluralist consensus was on the rise. Far from celebrating urban redevelopment as a broadly shared vision of city revitalization, both books highlighted its

destructive side. Both showed planners and policy professionals as out of touch with residents. In his work Gans demonstrated that professional planners and members of the working class in Boston's West End saw the world in radically different ways. Jacobs, for her part, showed, how little the professionals understood the way a tenuous pattern of social relationships could further such aims as public safety.⁵² Though neither book focused on African American populations, both showed how government action could become a source of deepened distrust, disorder, and discontent. Within a few years, the Kerner Commission Report painted in the racial particulars for rejecting the notion that assimilation was bringing about a society of dispersed inequalities, divided only by a succession of narrowly defined and ever-shifting issues.⁵³

Urban political economy provided a framework through which scholars could question classic pluralism, but it was not well positioned to highlight civil society, particularly the manifold ways in which it is layered. While Robert Putnam—initially by way of a study of Italian regional governments—put a spotlight on social capital,⁵⁴ it fell to later writers to bring a bottom-up view of civil society into focus and direct attention to the dynamics surrounding stratified relations. Consider two trenchant analyses of race and stratification and where they take us that urban political economy hasn't. Both Cathy Cohen's study of AIDS as a case of the politics of marginality and Mary Pattillo's treatment of race and class in the gentrification of a Chicago neighborhood provide us a bottom-up view of civil society and its complex part in the politics of inequality.⁵⁵

Both scholars reject the notion that the populace can be treated as a body of citizen-consumers on some form of equal footing. Both scholars also call for moving beyond a simple dichotomy between the dominant and the dominated. Cohen gives

attention to the varied ways in which marginality can be politically structured, and Pattillo centers her work on the role of actors in the middle—on brokers who mediate relations between elites at the top and those in society's lower ranks. She tells us that “the middle is the place where the actual face-to-face work of inequality transpires.”⁵⁶

Cohen and Pattillo alike make use of frameworks in which inequality is fundamental, but works in complicated ways. Consider marginality and its relation to a polity-centered approach. Cohen talks about historical experiences of exclusion and subordination out of which marginality is forged. She then defines marginality as a condition of “deficiency in the economic, political, and social resources used to guarantee access to the rights and privileges assumed by dominant groups.”⁵⁷ In a view from the top, economic, political, and social resources and their various consequences may appear to be neatly differentiated. Not so from the bottom—they are experienced as highly intertwined.

Cohen sets forth three analytical pillars to consider in the politics of marginality: (1) the import of a history of unequal power relations; (2) the development and importance of indigenous structures within the marginalized group; and (3) the absence of a unidirectional, top-down form of control and the presence instead of a dynamic and evolving body of relationships constituted from struggles between forces of domination and those of resistance.

Stratification occurs not just in differentiating dominant players from those in lesser positions, but also in relations within the marginal group.⁵⁸ The latter accounts for varied forms of marginality; stratification within the marginal group provides actors who can play the broker role. Pattillo argues that internal stratification means a black political

identity rests on shared struggle that consists of more than a sense of linked fate; it also involves discussion, debate, and sundry forms of engagement around what blackness means. As she puts it, there is “no ‘black’ way of doing things.”⁵⁹ Given the framework offered by Cohen and Pattillo, scholars need to be attentive to the resources, abilities, and inclinations of those in the bottom ranks of the system of social stratification.

Consider how concrete policy experiences can undermine trust. In tracing Chicago’s redevelopment experience, Pattillo points out that “promises are political acts.” As such, over time “they are pronounced, manipulated, retracted, and denied within a context of unequal abilities to define the situation.”⁶⁰ Even at the early stage of redevelopment (the 1950s), distrust of officialdom was high. To those on the lower rungs of society, unfulfilled promises have a very long history—their accumulated experience means that a rhetoric of good intentions readily evokes suspicion rather than confidence, cynicism rather than an inclination to cooperate. In short, people in the lower strata fit no mold of trusting citizens, eager to receive benefits from a benign government (or for that matter a benign society). Their reaction to policy initiatives is colored by a history of neglect, unmet promises, and more than occasional instances of blatant disregard and disrespect.⁶¹

By no means should it be assumed that the designs of policy makers proceed to application without being affected by the accumulated and differentiated experiences of various segments of the populace, in addition to the varied concerns of those all along the chain of official implementation.⁶² Thus, what to the official makers of policy may seem like a common occurrence may in fact differ greatly by social circumstance. For example, Cathy Cohen points out that “AIDS is a very different disease in poor black

communities than in white gay male communities.”⁶³ A failure to grasp that fact is reflected in the varying ways and differing speeds with which aspects of the AIDS issue were understood and addressed.

Policy is not made and carried out on a blank slate. Socio-economic inequalities enter the picture in multiple ways. Bear in mind that at the local level especially, policies de facto are co-produced.⁶⁴ Official agents of the government, whether directly or indirectly, depend heavily on the populace. Level of trust and patterns of interaction are fundamental.⁶⁵ Also, as Jane Jacobs argues, police and other agents of the government find that the demands of their tasks depend heavily on what citizens provide and on what different strata of society are able to provide through their own efforts.

Government-citizen relations are also complicated by how blame is understood. For an illustration let us return to ethos theory, especially Banfield’s elaborated version. This takes us back to an earlier assumption that people are carriers of values derived from their position in society and the socialization they have experienced.

Banfield talked about a present-time orientation (essentially an inability to defer gratification) in a way that connected it closely to the idea of a culture of poverty.⁶⁶ In his view any public effort to address poverty was doomed to failure because those who are persistently poor have a non-productive mindset and thus are unable to pursue a middle-class path of upward mobility. Because a mindset is transmitted to the younger generation at a very early age, there is little that government programs can do.

Contrast Banfield’s view with the “conditional approach” offered by sociologist Mario Luis Small.⁶⁷ In his study of a Boston public housing project, Small found that much theorizing about poverty is simplistic. Instead of a single prevalent mindset, he

found heterogenous views of the world and how it operates. Behaviors varied at a given time, and over time as well.⁶⁸ Instead of uniform social isolation and apathy, Small found many residents to have ties beyond the neighborhood, and most tellingly he discovered a subgroup actively involved in efforts to expand programs, improve the neighborhood, and enlarge opportunities for residents. Many of this group had been part of an earlier reform mobilization or were part of a household involved. They had a positive vision of what the community could be—in short, a future-time orientation.

The idea of a prevalent poverty of culture is further contradicted by a recent study of the underground economy in a Chicago neighborhood, again by a sociologist, Sudhir Venkatesh.⁶⁹ In contrast to the view that urban residents can usefully be viewed as value-carriers (bearers of a culturally transmitted ethos), he found that behavior, including time horizons, was largely guided by a scarcity of material resources. Moreover, this scarcity gave rise to no amoral pattern of conduct. Quite the contrary, there was a wide net of mutual assistance and a shared body of norms about obligations to others.⁷⁰

In short, close-up studies of poverty neighborhoods indicate that civil society in these communities is not incapable of a constructive relationship with government, though mending that relationship is not apt to be quick, easy, or cheap. Old assumptions and their implications stand in need of re-examination. As historian Alice O'Connor puts it, we need to reorient “research away from the problems and pathologies that plague low-income communities and toward a better understanding of how these conditions are maintained or made worse.”⁷¹

Consider what we have known for many decades, dating back to the urban disorder of the 1960s and earlier.⁷² The range of alienating policies and program

treatments experienced by the lower ranks of the social order are wide and deep. This experience has aggravated if not created a troubled government/civil society relationship. This relationship has become a profound part of the current political order. Its causes are complex and go back further than globalization, though it is certainly the case that deindustrialization has contributed greatly to the difficulties faced by those who dwell in the central city. To the evolution of a capitalist economy, at the very least we have to add race and government-service professionalism to the equation to account for the current state of government/civil society relations.⁷³

At the same time we should remember that there are instructive instances in which this ruptured government/civil society relationship has been repaired, though only over a limited policy span.⁷⁴ At the current stage of research, these instances stand as limited-scale case studies about a potential, not pieces in a systematic model for assessing how the urban political order might be in a process of re-forming.

Still we should not overlook the point that today's policy landscape is populated with efforts to mend government/civil society relations. Community policing, school reform, affordable housing, and neighborhood conservation are highly visible fronts in this struggle. Community development corporations (CDCs), charter schools, community-based organizing, contracting out and other market-related means, black churches as mobilizing and mediating forces, and various forms of citizen engagement are part of the picture.⁷⁵

Lacking, however, is an encompassing framework that bring these disparate elements into a coherent picture. A move toward such a picture calls for traveling along a different path from both classic pluralism and urban political economy, hence Cohen

and Pattillo are useful starting guides. Still they leave much uncharted. The following are some significant course markers:

(1) At the heart of the policy challenge left by the shift to a post-industrial city is a damaged set of government/civil society relations.

(2) Although damaged, these relations are hard to alter because they are heavily infused by society's system of stratification.

(3) The operation of the stratification system rests on multiple foundations, only some of which trace directly to the workings of a capitalist economy. Race and professionalism are separate and conceptually distinct strands, though practice weaves the various strands together.

(4) One source of reinforcement for the current pattern of government/civil society relations is the tendency for upper-strata groups to "blame the victim," that is, to see members of the lower strata as responsible for their own problems and as a source of risk to others.⁷⁶

(5) Another source of reinforcement is that the present pattern rests in part on a legacy of distrust among the lower strata and a history of deficient connections to the mainstream.

(6) Causal conditions are structured but not intractable, and behaviors spring not from a single source (such as a given culture) but a conjunction of factors. The importance of structural forces notwithstanding, we are following no inevitable trajectory. Instead, as contemporary scholarship increasingly suggests, outcomes are socially constructed and historically constituted.

The thrust of the discussion to this point has been toward a need for a broad conception of the urban political order. The polity-approach of Orren and Skowronek carry us in that direction. The interpenetration of state, market, and civil society provides an alternative to economic or social determinism, but steers clear of an assumption that government and politics form an autonomous sphere.⁷⁷ Moreover, Orren and Skowronek warn against any effort to treat jumbled forms of interpenetration as a highly integrated arrangement.⁷⁸ They offer an intercurrency of multiple orders as an alternative macro-view. And they join historian Alice O'Connor and others in calling for close attention to the role of "human and political agency."⁷⁹ With these considerations in mind, let us turn now to the new urban history and what it can tell us. As Orren and Skowronek argue, politics is historically constructed.

In the past, urban political scientists have drawn upon such diverse disciplines as economics, geography, psychology, sociology, and urban planning. For its part, urban history has received little attention beyond being a source for an unrelenting analysis of machine-versus-reform politics. The "new urban history" has, however, turned a page, and is important for several closely related reasons. First, it examines the political relations between city and suburbs as an interactive whole, in a regional context. Second, it emphasizes the role of race and class in urban areas without embracing any assumption about assimilation. Third, it demonstrates the power of home-owner identity as a political force. Finally, it emphasizes the role of human agents in constructing history.

Political scientists have too often studied urban politics without much reference to the regional context, and the dynamics of city-suburban relations. This is certainly the case in Who Governs?. Dahl, however, was not alone; the great majority of scholars in

urban politics ignored the regional context.⁸⁰ There were probably several reasons for this. One is the large number of local governments in many metropolitan areas. The fragmentation can be overwhelming. While Wood's 1400 governments in the New York region may have been an especially large number, even smaller numbers are daunting for researchers. For example, there are more than 160 cities in the Dallas / Fort Worth metroplex. These range from Dallas, with more than a million residents, to communities of 2500, with an array of types and sizes in between. Where and how does the analyst begin?

Second, it is fair to say that urban scholarship has emphasized the central city, because many academics found it to be more interesting than studying suburban entities. While Dennis Judd's (2005) point about the liberal biases of the 1960's generation may be overstated, it is clearly the case that scholars were attracted to the study of such progressive mayors as John Lindsey, Carl Stokes, Kevin White, etc. This was especially the case in contrast to suburban politicians who sometimes embodied the politics of NIMBYism and/or racism.⁸¹ A third reason was the tendency of many academic urbanists to be dismissive toward the suburbs as a cultural phenomenon. The suburbs were inhabited, in large part, by middle class white families who lived in "Little Boxes" in communities such as Levittown. Who would want to study the politics of such boring places? There were exceptions, of course. Fred Wirt's study of San Francisco in the 1970s was thoughtful (and avant-garde) in its consideration of the regional challenge to local autonomy, the "new regionalism" and intrastate federalism, as well as in its discussion of federal and state government influences (1974: pp 306-333). Current-generation scholars such as Margaret Weir (2005) and Todd Swanstrom (2007) have

begun to address in depth the neglect of regional context. Finally, many researchers in urban politics have been ahistorical—even antihistorical—in their approach to the metropolitan political environment, thus giving little attention to its evolving character over time.

The “new urban” historians have emphasized the dynamics of the political relations between city and suburbs as an interactive whole. No one has done this better than Robert Self in his award-winning book, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (2003). In this regard, Self discusses redevelopment programs and grass-roots efforts (including the Black Panthers) in Oakland. At the same time, his history examines the development of the “white noose” of suburbs around Oakland, while discussing the interaction with state and federal programs and policies. We will have more to say about Self below.

Another work which calls our attention to the city-suburban (and the national-local) political dynamic is Matthew Lassiter’s The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (2006). Lassiter discusses three fundamental transformations that occurred in the 1940s and the 1970s in the American South: the rise of the two-party system that replaced old line segregationist politics, the development of a middle-class ideology that expressed itself in “color-blind” rhetoric which replaced the traditional culture of White supremacy, and a process of regional convergence in which the South was no longer distinctive or exceptional from the rest of the country (2006: p. 3). In Lassiter’s words, his book “is about the grassroots politics produced by residential segregation and suburban sprawl and the interplay between the local and the national in the emergence of the center-right dynamic that has dominated American politics since the

late 1960s.” (Ibid.). While Lassiter admires the work of some of his predecessors, such as Arnold Hirsch (1983) and Thomas Sugrue (1996), he notes that much urban history “has been written from an inside-out perspective, largely confined to episodes of direct racial friction within the city limits of the North and lacking a consciously suburban approach to the political landscape and the postwar metropolis” (2006: p. 7).

In Lassiter’s view, “the next step for social and political histories is to establish a metropolitan framework that treats cities and suburbs as integral parts of the same narrative and extends the grassroots methodology to the South and the Sunbelt.” (Ibid.). The coming generation of students of urban politics would do well to heed Lassiter’s advice. Part I of his book, “The Triumph of Moderation”, centers around the grassroots mobilization of political moderates, trying to keep schools open in Atlanta in the aftermath of the Brown decision. The HOPE (Help Our Public Education) organization fought massive resistance and school closing from 1958 until the schools integrated in 1961. Part II, “The Revolt of the Center”, examines the anti-busing movement in Charlotte, North Carolina from 1969 to 1974. Part III, “Suburban Strategies”, provides a region-wide perspective on Democratic and Republican Party activities. In this section, Lassiter presents a shorter case study on annexation and consolidation in Richmond, Virginia. All three cases emphasize political activity in neighborhoods that Lassiter characterizes as “island suburbs”: “clusters of upper middle-class and wealthy White neighborhoods located inside the city limits and protected by exclusionary zoning policies from racial integration and socioeconomic diversity” (2006: p. 13). These include such neighborhoods as Atlanta’s Buckhead and Charlotte’s Myers Park.

Another historical work emphasizing city-suburban political dynamics is Howard Gillette's Camden After the Fall: Decline and Renewal in a Post-Industrial City (2005). Throughout, Gillette places the Camden case into a larger regional context. He discusses the rising influence of suburban Camden politicians in New Jersey state politics, and the implications of that development for the city. An entire chapter reviews the New Jersey Mount Laurel court cases mandating the provision and sharing of affordable housing in the region, and the lack of implementation of the court's ruling. The state government's takeover of Camden, and the execution of state policies with awareness of suburban political power, add another nuanced dimension to the narrative.⁸²

In treatment of race and class, the "new" urban historians contrast sharply with the classic works of political science covering much the same time period. Consider, for example, the view of Banfield and Wilson, writing in City Politics (1963). They acknowledge the existence of social cleavage in urban politics. They discuss such cleavage as haves versus have-nots, suburbs versus central city, natives versus immigrants, and Democrats versus Republicans. These, however, are subsumed into a fundamental conflict between two conceptions of the public interest. On the one hand, there is the middle class "public regarding" ethos, usually associated with the reform ideal. On the other hand, there is the immigrant "private regarding" ethos, usually associated with political machines (p. 46).

By contrast in the work of the younger historians, race and class are overt cleavage. Self (2003) gives extensive attention to both racial and class conflict in Oakland's redevelopment program. At the same time, he demonstrates how the forces of race and class came into play differently in three suburban East Bay communities. San

Leandro created “a working class community with middle-class amenities”, “the industrial garden” (2003: p. 107). Milpitas’s roots were in a United Auto Workers effort to plan an integrated community. The result was a community more integrated and democratic than other suburbs in the region. Still, Milpitas was not immune to a homeowner mentality. Fremont was the most planned community in the region, and, with some of the highest tax rates. As Fremont lacked the industrial base necessary to keep rates low, it was highly sensitive to class gradations in housing. Self concludes that political activities in the early postwar era created the foundation for the later “emergence of a political identity rooted in homeownership” (2003: p. 131).

Self is only one of a number of scholars who have recently published urban histories involving race and class issues. Martha Biondi’s To Stand and Fight (2003) depicts civil rights controversies in New York City in the 1940s and 1950s. Biondi’s work puts Sayer and Kaufman’s classic, Governing New York City (1965), in a fresh light. The “openness, responsiveness, and tolerance” (p. 720) of the New York City political system are not readily evident in Biondi’s study of the Black pursuit of civil rights. Matthew Countryman’s Up South (2006) makes a parallel contribution by following the course of civil rights and Black Power in Philadelphia from the end of World War II until the 1970s.

Overall, the new urban historians stress the importance of racial and class conflict, and the depth of divisions resulting from the cleavage. Their work provides a sharp contrast with assumptions about consensus and assimilation in the classic political science work.

The younger urban historians have also directed our attention to the importance of homeowner identity as a political force. Homeowner identity was never captured as a political force as part of Banfield and Wilson's "ethos theory". Self emphasizes how the home "as a political identity" came to dominate postwar politics and urbanization (2003: P. 31). Self later demonstrates how the homeowner mentality dominated the repeal of California's Rumford Act (fair housing legislation) in 1964, and in the tax reform push of the 1960s, which led in 1978 to the passage of Proposition 13, the nation's most stringent property tax limitation measure. The power of the homeowner interest is also a major theme in Becky Nicolaides's My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965. Homeowner identity was a major factor in residents organizing to preserve their neighborhoods from social diversification. In a provocative and thoughtful chapter on "racializing local politics", Nicolaides traces the political transformation of South Gate provide case studies, as the community changed from working class Democrats to substantial Goldwater support in the 1964 presidential election. Soon, South Gate was part of Richard M. Nixon's "silent majority".

The urban political historians have also re-directed our attention to the importance of individual agency on the part of elected officials, administrators, planners, and business leaders. Mayor Lee of New Haven was a model for the entrepreneurial mayor, as Dahl describes in Who Governs? Mayor Richard Daley in Chicago used his position as head of the Cook County Democratic Party to achieve favorable outcomes in development decisions, according to Banfield's Political Influence. Individual agency is denigrated as an important factor in much work in political economy. Thus, in City Limits, Paul Peterson argues that cities will choose developmental policies because of

economic imperatives. There seems to be little room for mayors to pursue redistributive alternatives and/or to opt out of developmental policies. A more recent exposition of this view is that of Robert Beauregard. In his concise and interesting book, When America Became Suburban (2006), Beauregard interprets the process of American suburbanization in the thirty years. On the one hand, Beauregard should be applauded for his historical approach. Indeed, he criticizes the “ahistoricism of writings in political economy and their cultural offspring” (p. xii). At the same time, individual agency is placed in a subsidiary position. Beauregard’s “interpretive scheme is made up of social forces, rather than of people and organizations making decisions and shaping the world.” (p. xv)

The role of human agency in constructing history is evident in the work of the “new” urban historians. In American Babylon, Robert Self shows an astute awareness of the influence of broader economic and social forces in the Oakland region. At the same time, whether he is discussing the activities of the Black Panther Party, civil rights activists, trade unionists, or homeowners, Self makes it clear that individuals – and grass roots groups – can make a difference. In The Silent Majority, Matthew Lassiter makes his case that individual political actors – and grass roots groups – impact political and policy outcomes. Biographers of such influential actors as New York’s planning czar, Robert Moses (Caro, 1974; Schwartz, 1993; Ballon and Jacksons, eds., 2007) and downtown and “new town” developer, James Rouse (Bloom, 2004; Olsen, 2003; Marx, 2008) provide eloquent testimony to the power of agency in urban politics.

Conclusion

The urban classics of the 1960s made flawed assumptions about the nature of the local political arena. Urban political economy made some useful correctives but did not

go far enough. Although some its schools of thought are less narrowly constituted than others, none delves into civil society in the depth that some key sociological studies have. Hence there is much that urban political science can learn, particularly from a bottom-up view of civil society and how the lower strata fit into the political order. For its part, the new urban history contributes to an enlarged view of that order by painting on a wide canvas, with due attention to federal policy, the city's regional setting, and the multi-sector foundations of local polities. In place of the single dominant path of development found in classical pluralism, analysis today can take a cue from history and explore the manner in which varied factors come together. The intercurrency concept of Orren and Skowronek provides a needed framework for considering the ways in which outcomes depend on how multiple factors mesh, clash, and co-exist.

Still, the “mother lode” of grand theory remains as a strong temptation. That the market is such a powerful force reinforces the temptation, and the positing of an overriding neo-liberal project constitutes one version of an unduly economy-centered explanation. Although we by no means dismiss the influence of the market, we regard this version of political economy as illustrative of a flawed approach, unduly narrowing the base of explanation.

Consider an application of Jason Hackworth's argument. In his view, following the public-debt crisis of the 1970s, a once-dominant Keynesian liberalism was done in by the ascendance of neoliberalism. In Hackworth's assessment of political change in New York City: “The austerity program instituted after the city's debt crisis shook apart the once solid New Deal coalition in the city.”⁸³ Important as the financial crunch was, privileging the explanatory power of economic factors in this way reduces a complex

restructuring of politics to a single factor when much more was at work. In this specific instance of the splintering of the New Deal coalition, other authors show how race played a major role.⁸⁴ As argued by Jonathan Rieder, while the sundering of New Deal ties had a wider context, the racial dimensions of immediate contacts had a tremendous impact.⁸⁵

Turning points and periodization are part of what urban political development should consider, but not in the form of oversimplifying the restructuring of city politics. As Orren and Skowronek caution, any present time rests on layers of past events—therefore “any realistic depiction of politics in time will include multiple orders.”⁸⁶ In the restructuring of city politics, we contend that interplays among race, class, and professionalization in various urban-service agencies are all part of what needs to be taken into account. For instance, coming out of the 1960s, struggles over the reshaping of urban-service agencies along with racial divides and demographic change played a part in realigning political loyalties in New York and other cities. Consider that in the latter days of what Hackworth calls neo-Keynesian period, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders cited technocratic professionalization as a major source of discontent.⁸⁷ Economic change aside, the interplay between race/ethnicity and the operating rules of public agencies put enormous pressure on the New Deal coalition. Such considerations should not be ignored.

Periodization raises other issues; the temptation may be strong to focus on current change and pay little heed to what seems unchanging. However, as Orren and Skowronek alert us, past layers of politics are a significant force. Although there is good reason to ask if the 1970s were years of major clashes that in combination set the stage for the city politics that followed, we believe it is useful to consider continuities as well.

In particular we think there is evidence of a persisting ecology of disadvantage that took a distinctive form as World War II came to a close (with, of course, significant roots earlier). Though some of the particulars vary by place, the presence of a marginalized urban population of substantial size is an ongoing phenomenon. Its foundations are clearly racial as well as economic. The separation of the politics of home from workplace, what Ira Katznelson calls “city trenches,” is another contributing factor,⁸⁸ as is a seemingly unwavering but racially tinged attachment to a belief in individual responsibility as the key to poverty and distress. Scholars may have abandoned explanations in the form of individuals as value carriers, but the nation’s policy discourse has not. All of these are matters worthy of further exploration, with special attention to how various policies and institutional arrangements intertwine and reinforce them.

Yet, in spite of a formidable array of forces, as a final (and less pessimistic) note, we put forward for consideration the possibility that, the neoliberal project notwithstanding, the position of society’s lower strata may be in an early stage of change. Though we do not downplay event analysis, we see much wisdom in Paul Pierson’s reminder that sometimes it has been “gradual interconnected social processes that created conditions for a set of triggering events.”⁸⁹ (2004: 85). Change by accretion is not to be ignored, but neither, of course, is the possibility of unyielding continuity.

Still the question remains as to whether the long period of urban transformation following World War II, that is, the remaking of the industrial city into a post-industrial place, has sufficiently wound down to invite a fresh periodization and characterization, and, if so, what might that possibly be. With the insight that comes from looking back, urban historians have given us a new look at this period of urban makeover. Among

other things, in contrast with the more elite-centered research of regime analysis, historians have given major attention to the city-suburb relation and thereby put the spotlight on what we might call residential politics, particularly the rise of home-owners as a powerful political identity. Race and immigration, national policy, state practices of allowing and encouraging local-government fragmentation, and market choices have combined to give us metropolitan areas containing sharply clashing interests, weak means to respond to inter-local conflicts, and inhospitable ground for wide-ranging public mindedness to take hold. Growing complexity and social differentiation have made it increasingly urgent to think of the central city and its suburbs as integral parts of a single political order. Metropolitan politics is not simply an ancillary feature of city politics but increasingly the main arena.

In that context particularly, looking back over the time since World War II, we can see that, contrary to classical pluralism, inequalities have been anything but dispersed. Instead, clustered inequalities have become a threat to social cohesion, hampered the performance of urban schools, and posed enduring problems for law enforcement. In the period of urban transformation, many city agendas were dominated by a “convergence of power” between city hall and major business interests with the result that urban neighborhoods were neglected, less affluent city populations bore social disruption and economic dislocation, and intergroup tensions flourished. Lower SES populations remain to a degree disconnected from mainstream opportunities and often alienated from the service agencies of city government, especially the police. Instead of the kind of politically mediated mutual adjustment between groups predicted by pluralism, we have instead had an ongoing version of ‘winner take all.’

Yet the contemporary urban scene in America is not totally bleak. There are signs of an emerging era of urban reconstruction. Neighborhood and community organizing has proved to be a durable force.⁹⁰ Working through such entities as CDCs, the nonprofit sector is a significant contributor to affordable housing and neighborhood conservation. Despite decreased federal funding, community policing continues as a presence in local law enforcement. The improvement of urban education remains the mechanical rabbit that the hounds of reform are unable to catch, but there are a few promising developments—not the least of which is that school performance is now a matter of national concern. Advocacy for children and youth, early childhood education, and youth-development programs seem to be on the upswing. Though federal grants remain a force in decline, federal tax law and the Community Reinvestment Act occupy a significant place. And one of the distinctive features of the urban scene in America is the part played by philanthropy. Though this is hardly a matter for unbounded optimism, it is a subject much in need of research. And it could be that foundations, particularly community foundations, are a growing force. In some instances, they are the initiating means by which problems of inequality are addressed.

With the refashioning of the central business district no longer the policy magnet it once was, there is opportunity now to consider the urban condition more broadly than in the past, bearing in mind the argument of Orren and Skowronek that any given time is home to multiple and not necessarily congruent orders. As part of this process, we have suggested that urban scholars alter or expand the political-economy framework to give more attention to civil society. And we should remember as well that civic life itself is almost certain to be composed of multiple orders.

Freed of the notion of a master process of development, we can think anew about the period we may be entering. If it is indeed potentially a period of city reconstruction, we can put our minds to the task of devising more constructive urban policies than those that came with the post World War II period of urban transformation. A special

¹ The transition has important roots in Lawrence Herson's APSR article titled "The Lost World of Municipal Government" (1957).

² Key works were Dahl (1961); Sayre and Kaufman (1960); Banfield (1961); and Banfield and Wilson (1963).

³ (2004)

⁴ For a recent succinct statement of pluralism, see Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (2003: 13).

⁵ On this count, it is useful to pay heed to the tradeoffs in Thorngate's postulate; see Weyck (1979: 35-37).

⁶ See Abrams (1982) and Mills (1959).

⁷ (2004: 16).

⁸ (2004: 1-32).

⁹ It is well also to remember the caution from such scholars as Shanley and Schuck (1974), Dawson (1994), and Cohen (1999) about a tendency to equate groups with formal associations and about the assumptions that tendency is based upon.

¹⁰ Salisbury (1964).

¹¹ See Merelman 200x

¹² A peculiar pattern took shape. For a time the community power debate continued, but the intense conceptual controversy at its center had little apparent role in guiding future research

¹³ It was preceded by *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (19xx), and was in some ways an application of that book's theoretical argument.

¹⁴ Role differentiation, in Dahl's words, "ended a period when social status, education, wealth, and political influence were united in the same hands. There was never again anything quite like it" (1961: 24).

¹⁵ Sayre and Kaufman (1960) are especially explicit on this point.

¹⁶ See Parsons (1954).

¹⁷ (1961: 84). Dahl also talks about the extent to which democratic systems, with elections as the regulator, provide belief systems within which *leaders* are confined. See also the discussion of New Haven political leader John Golden on p. 75, and the emphasis on "common values and goals" on p. 92.

¹⁸ (1961: 61). More widely Dahl observes: "In pluralistic, democratic political systems with wide political consensus the range of acceptable strategies is narrowed by beliefs and habits ..." (1961: 225). Even for the earlier period of New Haven in which ethnic conflict was at a peak, Dahl talks about "the yearning for assimilation and acceptance" (1961: 33). Thus, in *Who Governs?*, consensus is a pervasive theme, along with dispersed inequalities.

¹⁹ Mayor Richard Lee served as Dahl's exemplar of political capacity, and in Banfield's book on Chicago politics Mayor Richard J. Daley played the role of master broker and problem-solver.

²⁰ To be noted, however, is that, in an interview years after the publication of *Who Governs?*, Dahl acknowledged that he should have paid greater attention to "limiting factors," that is, how public decision-makers "need to take into account the decisions and influences of the market system" (Dahl 1986: 192).

²¹ Interestingly, Dahl notes that patterns of political participation correspond with socio-economic characteristics, but makes little of this point (1961: 282-293).

²² Documented notably in the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968).

²³ Stone, Whelan, and Murin 1979, 1986).

²⁴ O'Connor 1973.

²⁵ Katznelson (1976).

²⁶ Lindblom 1977.

²⁷ Jones and Bachelor (1993:253). For other explorations of this point see also Bailey (1984); Tabb and Sawers (1978; 1984); Swanstrom (1985); and Fuchs (1992).

²⁸ Shefter 1977; see also his subsequent book 1985, revised 1992.

²⁹ In addition to their 1984 book, note also the essay in their subsequent edited collection (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003: esp. pp. 13-15)

³⁰ Peterson (1981); A related analysis extended to the suburbs is Mark Schneider's *The Competitive City: The Political Economy of Suburbia* (1989).

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- ³¹ Particularly useful sources on the general debate are Abrams (1982); Sewell (1992); and Hay (1995).
- ³² See especially Mollenkopf (1983); Mollenkopf (1992); and Rae (2003).
- ³³ Molotch (1976); see also Molotch (1993); Logan and Molotch (1987); and Jonas and Wilson (1999)..
- ³⁴ Mollenkopf (1983); Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom (2004); (Sassen 1991; Clarke and Gaile 1998; Savitch and Kantor 2002; Sellers 2002); and Brenner (2004).
- ³⁵ Harding (1997).
- ³⁶ Hackworth (2007: 16).
- ³⁷ See especially Elkin (1985, 1987); Fainstein and Fainstein (1983, 1986), Stone and Sanders (1987) and Stone (1989).
- ³⁸ Shefter (1976: 41).
- ³⁹ Crain (1968).
- ⁴⁰ Note, however, that suburban experiences fit a different pattern, to be explored in the section below on the new urban history. See Nicolides (2002).
- ⁴¹ Stone (1989).
- ⁴² This interconnection is at the heart also of Floyd Hunter's Atlanta study (1953).
- ⁴³ Stone (1989: 192).
- ⁴⁴ On the consequences of this limited authority for John Daniels, New Haven's first and so far only, African American mayor, see Rae 2006; Cohen 2001; and Summers and Klinkner (1996).
- ⁴⁵ See, for example, historian Thomas O'Connor's examination of Boston's experience (1993).
- ⁴⁶ Pattillo (2007: 8).
- ⁴⁷ Goss (1988).
- ⁴⁸ For a similar assessment of the Canadian experience, see Golden and Slack (2006).
- ⁴⁹ Cohen and Dawson (1993); Cohen (2001); Fung (2004); and Burns (2006).
- ⁵⁰ Jacobs (1961). Unlike Dahl, Jacobs put forward grounds on which the benign character of executive-centered leadership might be questioned. Contrast with Jacobs, Dahl's treatment of "the new men"— (1961: 62).
- ⁵¹ Gans (1962).
- ⁵² Note, by contrast, that Jacobs work and her ideas such as "eyes on the street" are thoroughly integrated into Rae's recent historical treatment of New Haven (2003).
- ⁵³ National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968).
- ⁵⁴ Putnam (19993).
- ⁵⁵ Cohen (1999); Pattillo (2007).
- ⁵⁶ Pattillo (2007: 307).
- ⁵⁷ Cohen (1999: 37-38)
- ⁵⁸ One might add that there may be more than one marginal group, further complicating intra-marginality relations. See, for example, Clarke et al (2006).
- ⁵⁹ Pattillo (2007: 303).
- ⁶⁰ Pattillo (2007: 256).
- ⁶¹ The lack of respect is not confined to particular instances, of which these is an abundance, but it also encompasses a general sense of place in society. See esp. Halpern (1995: 228-231).
- ⁶² For a telling instance of how implementation is variously constructed, see the treatment of AIDS prevention by Cohen (1999) and Brown (1999).
- ⁶³ Cohen (1999: 345).
- ⁶⁴ Macedo and Karpowitz (2006).
- ⁶⁵ Bryk and Schneider (2002).
- ⁶⁶ Banfield (1968, 1970).
- ⁶⁷ (Small 2004)
- ⁶⁸ On many counts his findings concur with those on Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes by Venkatesh (2000). See also Naples (1998) on Baltimore public housing.
- ⁶⁹ Venkatesh (2006). See also the critical assessment of the culture of poverty based on extensive field work in Chicago by Wilson (1996).
- ⁷⁰ A strength of such work as that by Small and Venkatesh is that they not only assert a contrary to position to earlier work by Banfield and others, but that through in-depth field they also document the counter-claims they set forth.
- ⁷¹ O'Connor (1999: 119).

⁷² On this matter there is a clear paper trail, consisting of commission reports (e.g., the National Advisory Commission on Civil on Civil Disorders 1968), social science accounts (e.g., Clark 1965), and in-depth journalism (e.g., Jacobs 1966; Lyford 1966; and Conot 1967).

⁷³ For instance, see how a code of professional police conduct can stand as a barrier to community policing—Herbert (2006). On professionalism more generally as a barrier to government-citizen relations, see Marquand (2004).

⁷⁴ Examples include: the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (Medoff and Sklar 1994); school reform efforts by IAF affiliates in Texas (Shirley 1997); and Warren 2001); affordable housing and neighborhood conservation efforts in Boston and New York (Van Hoffman 2003; Grogan and Proscio 2000); selected instances of school reform in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia (Bryk and Schneider 2002; Meier 2002; and Gold et al 2001); and community policing and school reform in Chicago (Fung 2004); Boston's youth anti-violence campaign (Pruitt 2001; Kennedy, Barga, and Piehl 2001; Berrien and Winship 2002, 2003; McRoberts 2003; and Jennings 2005).

⁷⁵ On black churches, see McRoberts (2003); Smith and Harris (2005); and Owens (2007).

⁷⁶ Pattillo notes that marginalized groups “are blamed for the decadence and decline of the American city, resulting in a stream of regressive, if not punitive, policies” (2007: 19; see also p. 264).

⁷⁷ Of course, there are separately configured entities and significant autonomy in day-to-day operations. The lack of autonomy comes from the way in which decision-makers incorporate context into their actions as well as from overt interactions between and among the three spheres.

⁷⁸ See also Thelen (2004).

⁷⁹ O'Connor (1999: 119). From different disciplinary perspectives, see the parallel arguments by Katznelson (1997); Bates et al (1998); and Sewell (200x).

⁸⁰ Note, however, the seldom-cited review of *Who Governs?* by Price (1962).

⁸¹ Judd's collaborator, Todd Swanstrom (2007), notes “I have always viewed the urban politics field's object of analysis to be metropolitan areas as a whole, where now more than 80% of the American people now live. Now, there's a big field! (p. 1).

⁸² While Gillette is excellent on the New Jersey context, he has little to say about Philadelphia, Camden's relation to the Philadelphia region, and Camden's place in the larger northeastern megalopolis.

⁸³ Hackworth (2007:34).

⁸⁴ Mollenkopf (1992); Self (2003); and Thompson (2006).

⁸⁵ Rieder (1985).

⁸⁶ Orren and Skowronek (2004: 17).

⁸⁷ National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968: 284-288).

⁸⁸ Katznelson (1981); for a west coast version of the separation, see Nicolaides (2002).

⁸⁹ Abrams (1982); Sewell (1996); and Pierson (2004:85).

⁹⁰ Orr (2007).